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This article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the intellectual property case law of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"). Within the last three years, the ECHR has issued a trio of
intellectual property rulings interpreting the right of property protected by the European Convention on
Human Rights. These decisions, which view intellectual property through the lens of fundamental rights,
have important consequences for the region's innovation and creativity policies. The cases are also emblem-
atic of a growing number of controversies in domestic and international law over the intersection of human
rights, property rights, and intellectual property. The article analyzes this trend and uses it to develop
three distinct paradigms to identify the proper place of intellectual property issues in the European human
rights system. It concludes that the ECHR should find a violation of the right of property in intellectual
property disputes only in cases of arbitrary government conduct.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Europe, human rights law is intellectual property's new frontier. This
statement will no doubt surprise many observers of the region's intellectual
property system, which has steadily expanded over the last few decades. The
mechanisms of that expansion have included a litany of now familiar legal
and regulatory tools: the negotiation and ratification of multilateral agree-
ments, the promulgation of European Community ("EC") directives, the
rulings of the powerful European Court of Justice, and the revision of na-
tional laws and administrative regulations. The result of these cumulative
and interrelated initiatives is a highly developed intellectual property sys-
tem that is strongly protective of creators, innovators, and businesses.
This regional intellectual property regime has developed in relative isola-
tion from Europe's other judicial powerhouse, the European Court of
Human Rights ("ECHR" or "Court").' The ECHR began its existence
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School. An earlier version of this article was presented at the New York University Law School Collo-
quium on Innovation Policy. Thanks to Graeme Austin, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Jane Ginsburg, Anthony
Reese, Katja Weckstrom, and Diane Zimmerman for insightful comments and suggestions.
1. For a detailed discussion of the ECHR's success and its influence on other international tribunals,
see Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to
Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REv. 899, 917-22 (2005); Laurence R. Heifer, Adjudicating Copyright
Claims Under the TRIPs Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J.
357, 399-410 (1998) [hereinafter Heifer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims]; Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-
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modestly as an optional judicial review mechanism for European states that
had ratified the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms 2 ("European Convention" or "Convention") and its Proto-
cols. But in the half century since its creation, the ECHR has evolved into
something far more momentous-the judicial guardian of a "constitutional
instrument of European public order."3 The Court now reviews tens of
thousands of complaints each year, and its jurisdiction extends the length
and breadth of the continent, encompassing 800 million people in forty-
seven nations from Azerbaijan to Iceland and from Portugal to Russia. 4
One might reasonably ask what an international human rights court and
the human rights treaty it interprets has to do with intellectual property.
The answer is the right of property, which appears in the European Conven'-
tion together with more widely recognized civil and political liberties such
as the prohibitions of slavery and torture, due process rights, and freedom of
expression. Yet the protection of "the peaceful enjoyment of ... posses-
sions" in Article 1 of Protocol 1 ("Article 1")5 has long been considered
among the weakest rights in the Convention system, affording governments
broad discretion to regulate private property in the public interest. 6
Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 297-98
(1997).
2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
3. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Cr. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1995) (preliminary
objections).
4. See ECHR, SURVEY OF AcTiVITIEs 2006, http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/69564084-9825-
430B-9150-A9137DD22737/0/Survey-2006.pdf.
5. Article 1 of Protocol 1 states in its entirety:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Mar.
20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, [hereinafter Protocol 1]. Although the drafters of Article 1 "spoke of'right
of property' or 'right to property' to describe the subject-matter" protected by this clause, Marckx v.
Belgium, App. No. 6833/74, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A), ¶ 63 (1979), the ECHR has consistently de-
scribed this provision as guaranteeing the right of property. See. e.g., Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, App.
No. 35014/97, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 4 [52], 129 (Grand Chamber 2007) (judgment of June 19, 2006)
(holding that government had "failed to strike the requisite fair balance between the general interests of
the community and the protection of the right of property") (emphasis added) [Due to a change in 2000,
recent volumes of the European Human Rights Report do not use standard citation formats for cases. For
the reader's convenience, the Report's citation is given, along with the more traditional starting page
number in brackets afterward. Eds.].
6. See Arjen van Rijn, Right to the Peaceful Enjoyment of One's Poysessions, in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 863, 864 (Pieter van Dijk et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006)
("[T]he right of property has lost a good deal of its inviolability, also in the Member States of the
Council of Europe, under the influence of modern social policy (Sozialstaat). This fact is reflected in the
very far-reaching limitations which Article 1 allows.").
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Partly for this reason, the ECHR and the European Commission of
Human Rights ("European Commission" or "Commission") for decades
gave intellectual property issues a wide berth. Intellectual property claim-
ants did not file any complaints alleging violations of property rights until
the early 1990s. And when these claimants did allege such violations, the
ECHR and the European Commission summarily dismissed their chal-
lenges. Applying a restrictive interpretation of Article 1, the two tribunals
eschewed searching scrutiny of national courts and administrative agencies
and allowed Europe's intellectual property system to evolve largely unfet-
tered by human rights concerns.
7
This judicial reticence has now decisively ended. Within the last three
years, the ECHR has issued a trio of decisions holding that patents, trade-
marks, copyrights, and other economic interests in intangible knowledge
goods are protected by the European Convention's right of property.8 The
most recent of these rulings-a 2007 judgment of the Grand Chamber in
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v, Portugal-is especially striking.9 The case involved'a
dispute between two corporations, the well-known American brewer and its
longstanding Czech rival, Bud&jovický Budvar, over the exclusive right to
market "Budweiser" beer in Portugal. The ECHR concluded that both reg-
istered trademarks and applications to register such marks fall within the
ambit of the treaty's property rights clause. On the particular facts
presented, however, the Court found that the Portuguese government had
not violated Article 1.10 Nevertheless, the analysis in Anheuser-Busch sug-
gests that the ECHR recognizes the broader human rights implications of
the region's innovation and creativity policies and that its future rulings
may influence intellectual property protection standards in Europe."1
7. See infra Part III (reviewing intellectual property rulings of the ECHR and the European
Commission).
8. See Dima v. Romania, App. No. 58472/00, para. 87 (2005) (admissibility decision) (in French only;
unofficial English translation on file with author) (copyrighted works protected by Article 1); Melnychuk
v. Ukraine, App. No. 28743/03, para. 8 (2005) (admissibility decision) (intellectual property protected
by Article 1); Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 [8461,
855-56 (Chamber 2007) (judgment of Oct. 11, 2005) (registered trademarks protected by Article 1).
9. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 [8301 (Grand Cham-
ber 2007).
10. The facts of the Anheuser-Busch case are complex. In essence, the ECHR concluded that Portugal
had not interfered with the American brewer's application to register the trademark "Budweiser" be-
cause the application had been contested by Bud6jovicki Budvar, the owner of a previously registered
geographical indication for "Budweiser Bier." For a more detailed analysis of the case, see infra Part
III.A.
11. Intellectual property owners have heralded Anheuser-Busch as a watershed ruling, suggesting that
the case may trigger the filing of new complaints alleging violations of Article 1. See, e.g., Burkhart
Goebel, Geographical Indications and Trademarks in Europe, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 1165, 1179 (2005)
(describing the 2005 Chamber judgment as "remarkable and most important" in recognizing trademarks
"as protected fundamental rights"); Arthur Rogers, Anheuser-Busch Hails European Court Ruling that
Trademark Applications Get Protections, 24 INT'L TRADE REP. 72, 72 (2007) (characterizing the 2007 Grand
Chamber judgment as a "landmark" decision).
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From just this brief description, the Grand Chamber judgment in
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal may strike many observers as misguided in
several respects. First, the decision protects the fundamental rights of mul-
tinational corporations rather than those of natural persons. For reasons I
explain below, the ECHR's adjudication of property rights claims by busi-
ness entities is indisputably authorized by Article l's text and the intent of
its drafters. 12 Such cases nevertheless sit uneasily with a treaty whose princi-
pal objective is to protect the civil and political liberties of individuals. This
is particularly true given that serious or systemic violations of those liberties
are occurring in many countries. 13 In addition, with the accession to the
Convention of Eastern European states in the 1990s, the ECHR's caseload
has exploded. The result is a mountainous backlog of pending complaints.14
Adding intellectual property disputes to the Court's already vastly
overburdened docket will only make it more difficult for the judges to adju-
dicate other complaints that allege violations of fundamental rights.
A second concern relates to the broader legal and political context in
which the ECHR's recent intellectual property rulings are situated. The last
several years have seen an explosion of competing human rights claims relat-
ing to intellectual property-in Europe, in the United States, and in numer-
ous international venues. There are two separate catalysts for these
developments.
On the one hand, the expansion of intellectual property protection stan-
dards raises numerous human rights concerns relating to the right to life,
health, food, privacy, freedom of expression, and enjoying the benefits of
scientific progress. International experts, government officials, judges, and
scholars are responding to these concerns by analyzing the interface between
the two legal regimes15 and, in particular, whether human rights should
12. See Protocol 1, supra note 5, art. 1 ("Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoy-
ment of his possessions.") (emphasis added). See also infra notes 23 & 178 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the rationales for protecting the property rights of corporations and other business entities in the
European human rights system).
13. See, e.g., Eua. PARL. ASSEMB., Implementation of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights:
Supplementary Introductory Memorandum (revised), AS/Jur (2005) 55 rev., 11-13 (2005), available at htcp://
assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2005/20051220_Ejdoc55.pdf (assessing compliance with ECHR judg-
ments involving widespread human rights abuses by the Russian military in Chechnya and massive
structural failures of the Russian courts and the criminal justice system); Menno T. Kamminga, Is the
European Convention on Human Rights Sufficiently Equipped to Cope with Gross and Systematic Violations?, 12
NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 153, 153-54 (1994) (analyzing past cases and suggesting that there will be an
increasing number of systemic human rights abuses challenged before the ECHR); Paul Mahoney, Specu-
lating on the Future of the Reformed European Court of Human Rights, 20 HUM. RTs. L.J. 1, 4 (1999) (predict-
ing that the ECHR will increasingly be confronted with "serious human rights violations" such as
"minorities in conflict with [a] central government" and cases relating to "terrorism, violence, and civil
strife").
14. Lucius Caflisch, The Reform of the European Court of Human Rights: Protocol No. 14 and Beyond, 6
Hum. RTS. L. REV. 403, 404 (2006) ("[T]he Court is presently confronted with an accumulated case-load
of 82,600 applications, out of which 45,550 were made in 2005, the yearly capacity of absorption of the
Court now being at around 28,000 cases.").
15. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Sub-
stantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
4
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serve as "corrective[s] when [intellectual property] rights are used exces-
sively and contrary to their functions."'16 On the other hand, litigants,
lawmakers, and courts are increasingly invoking fundamental rights-in-
cluding the right of property-as a justification for protecting intellectual
property and the corporations and individuals that own it." This counter-
vailing trend is reflected in treaties,' 8 reports of international expert bod-
ies,19 and judicial rulings in Europe 20 and the United States. 21
Rights: Human Rights and Intellectual Property, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (Dec. 14, 2001) (analyzing
conflicts between intellectual property and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights); The High Commissioner, Report of the High Commissioner on the Impact of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, delivered to the Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001); ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, The Realization of Economic., Social and Cultural Rights,
at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/L.20 (Aug. 11, 2000) (identifying conflicts between intellectual
property and "the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, the
right to health, the right to food, and the right to self-determination"). For more detailed analyses of
these developments, see, for example, Christophe Geiger, "Constitutionalising" Intellectual Property Law?
The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 INT'L REv. INTELL.
PROP. & COMPErTlIION L. 371, 382, 390-97 (2006) [hereinafter Geiger, Constitutionalising Intellectual
Property law] (analyzing recent intellectual property cases from Belgium, France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, and countries outside of Europe that raise non-trivial freedom of expression issues);
Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of Intelleitual Property Law?, 35 INT'L
REV. INTrLL. PRoP. & COMPETITION L. 268, 277 (2004) [hereinafter Geiger, Fundamental Rights Safe-
guard] (analyzing "decisions in the field of copyright in which the freedom of expression has been in-
voked to justify a use that is not covered by an exception provided for in [intellectual property] law");
Laurence R. HeIfer, Towarda Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 971,
1001-14 (2007) (hereinafter Heifer, Human Rights Framework] (analyzing recent treaty-making initiatives
in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organiza-
tion, and the World Intellectual Property Organization concerning the relationship between human
rights and intellectual property); Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dy-
namics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 26-53 (2004) (analyzing
intellectual property standard setting in the biodiversity, plant genetic resources, public health, and
human rights regimes).
16. Geiger, Fundamental Rights Safeguard, supra note 15, at 278; see also Heifer, Human Rights Frame-
work, supra note 15, at 1017-18 (analyzing how international human rights law can be interpreted to
impose "external limits on intellectual property").
17. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE
L.J. 1, 1 (2004) (stating that "[o)ne of the most revolutionary legal changes in the past generation has
been the 'propertization' of intellectual property"); Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International
Intellectual Property Law, 40 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1021, 1032 (2007) (stating that "the embrace of [intel-
lectual property] by human rights advocates and entities . . . is likely to further entrench some dangerous
ideas about property: in particular, that property rights as human rights ought to be inviolable and ought
to receive extremely solicitous attention from the international community").
18. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 17, Dec. 7, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1
("Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired posses-
sions .... Intellectual property shall be protected."), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/
pdf/text_en.pdf.
19. See ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The Right of
Everyone to Benefit front the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary
or Artistic Production of lthich He or She Is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph 1(c) of the Covenant), U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/GC/17 (Nov. 21, 2005) [hereinafter General Comment], available at http://www.ohchr.org/en-
glish/bodies/cescr/docs/gc17.doc.
20. See, e.g., Joseph Straus, Design Protection for Spare Parts Gone in Europe? Proposed Changes to the EC
Directive: The Commission's Mandate and its Doubtful Execution, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 391, 398
(2005) (discussing 2000 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court holding that patents constitute
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The ECHR's entry into this maelstrom of competing human rights-based
claims to restrict or expand intellectual property raises important and diffi-
cult questions. For example, does intellectual property deserve to be treated
as a fundamental right? And if it does, how does a human rights-inspired
conception of intellectual property differ from existing rules that promote
innovation and creativity? More concretely, what role, if any, should the
ECHR play in shaping innovation and creativity policy in Europe? Should
the Court favor the rights of corporate intellectual property owners over the
rights of individual users and consumers, or should it strike a distinctive
human rights balance among these actors with competing interests?
In this article, I consider one important dimension of these questions in
light of the ECHR's recent intellectual property rulings. I provide the first
detailed assessment of the European human rights tribunals' Article 1 intel-
lectual property case law. 22 And I develop a comprehensive proposal for the
ECHR to adjudicate intellectual property disputes under the European Con-
vention's property rights clause.
The article begins in Part II with an overview of the right of property in
Article 1 and the decisions interpreting it. Part III develops a tripartite
framework to analyze the ECHR's intellectual property case law, including
decisions that commentators have not previously identified. I use this frame-
work to link together a series of seemingly disconnected rulings and to ex-
pose the many points of intersection between Europe's human rights and
intellectual property systems. Part IV analyzes three distinct paradigms that
the ECHR may apply in future intellectual property disputes. I label these
approaches the rule of law paradigm, the enforcement paradigm, and the
intellectual property balancing paradigm. Each paradigm finds support in
the Court's case law and its interpretive methodologies. However, the three
paradigms have radically different consequences for innovation and creativ-
ity policy in Europe. I analyze these consequences and emphasize the sys-
temic effects of overlaying two previously unrelated legal regimes. I argue
property under the German Constitution); Thomas Crampton, Apple Gets French Support in Music Compati-
bility Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at C9 (discussing a ruling of the French Constitutional Council,
the country's highest judicial body, which "declared major aspects of the so-called iPod law unconstitu-
tional" and "made frequent reference to the 1789 Declaration on Human Rights and concluded that the
law violated the constitutional protections of property").
21. See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (rejecting a claim that the
federal government's uncompensated use of a patent amounts to a taking of private property in violation
of the U.S. Constitution), reh'g denied, 464 F.3d 1335 (Fed Cit. 2006).
22. The few existing analyses of intellectual property in the European human rights system focus on
treaty provisions that restrict intellectual property-such as the right to freedom of expression-or em-
phasize the European Convention's influence on the intellectual property laws of a specific country. See P.
Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 343 (Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); Timothy Pinto, The Influence of the European Convention on Intellectual Property
Rights, 24 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 209 (2002). No comprehensive study of the European human rights
tribunals' intellectual property jurisprudence under the Convention's property rights clause has ever been
attempted.
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that the ECHR should follow the rule of law paradigm and restrict its re-
view of Article 1 intellectual property claims to cases of arbitrary govern-
ment conduct. Part V briefly concludes.
II. EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY
This Part surveys the property rights jurisprudence of the European
human rights tribunals, highlighting issues that are relevant to the more
detailed analysis of the intellectual property case law that appears in the next
Part of the article. Before turning to this survey, however, a brief introduc-
tion to the structure of the European human rights system and the ECHR's
interpretive methodologies is in order.
The European Convention enshrines a broad catalogue of civil and politi-
cal liberties. The primary beneficiaries of these liberties are natural persons,
although certain rights of corporations also receive protection, including the
right of property.23 In addition, the Convention is principally a charter of
negative liberties that constrain the behavior of state actors. But it also im-
poses a limited set of positive obligations on European governments.2 4
When reviewing the actions of national governments, the ECHR gives
pride of place to the Convention's text, from which it has distilled a diverse
array of bright-line rules and multi-part balancing tests. But other interpre-
tive methodologies have been equally vital forces in shaping European
human rights jurisprudence. For example, the Court assesses the functional
importance of particular rights in democratic societies, the rationales gov-
ernments advance for restricting those rights, the arguments for and against
deference to domestic decisionmakers, and the need for the Convention to
evolve in response to legal, political, and social trends in Europe.2 1 As ex-
plained below, the Court has applied each of these doctrines and interpretive
tools when analyzing the right of property.
A. Article 1 of Protocol 1: Protecting Peaceful Enjoyment of Possessions
The protection of "the peaceful enjoyment of possessions" for "every nat-
ural or legal person" is one of the more controversial and obscure provisions
in the European human rights system.26 The right appears not in the Con-
23. See generally MARIUS EMBERLAND, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF COMPANIES: EXPLORING TH-E STRUC
TURE OF ECHR PROTECTION (2006).
24. See generally ALASTAIR R. MOWBRAY, TI-E DEVELOPMENT O17 POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2004). For
a discussion of "positive obligations" relating to the right of property, see infra Part IV.B.
25. See Heifer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims, supra note 1, at 407.
26. For more detailed analyses of the right of property in the European human rights system, see ALl
RIZA (OBAN, PROTECTION 01 PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 124-25 (2004); CAMILO B. SHULI-E, THE EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF PROPERTY
(2004); Rijn, supra note 6.
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vention's primary text, but in Article 1 of its first Protocol. 27 This place-
ment, as well as the absence of any mention of the word "rights" in Article
1, reflects a disagreement among European governments over the inclusion
of a property rights clause in the treaty as well as the scope and extent of
protection it provides. 28
The Convention's drafters recognized that democratic governments need
leeway to adopt or modify economic and social policies implicating private
property without, in every instance, compensating adversely affected owners.
On the other hand, the drafters also understood that the rule of law in gen-
eral and the stability and predictability of property rights in particular
would be undermined if governments could arbitrarily deprive owners of
their possessions. 29 In attempting to reconcile these competing perspectives,
the European Court and Commission have created a complex and intricate
jurisprudence interpreting the right of property.
B. The Subject Matter and Temporal Scope of the Right of Property
A preliminary issue the tribunals faced was defining Article l's subject
matter scope. The Court and Commission adopted a capacious interpretation
of the word "possessions," extending it to a broad array of "concrete propri-
etary interest[s]" having economic value.30 Whether such interests qualify as
possessions does not depend on their status in domestic law. 1 Rather, Arti-
cle 1 has an "autonomous meaning" that authorizes the ECHR to decide
"whether the circumstances of the case, considered as a whole, may be re-
garded as having conferred on the applicant title to a substantive interest
protected by" Article 1.32 Applying this expansive if amorphous standard,
the Court has adjudicated restrictions on most economically important types
of tangible and intangible property, including land, chattels, licenses, leases,
contractual rights, corporate securities, business goodwill and, as described
in detail below, intellectual property. 3
Article l's temporal scope extends to current and future proprietary inter-
ests. As the ECHR recently stated, "'Possessions' can be either (1) 'existing
possessions' or (2) assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant
.. has at least a 'legitimate expectation' of obtaining effective enjoyment of
a property right. "'34 The Court has extended the latter line of cases to en-
forceable debts, lease renewal options, final court judgments, and vested
27. See Protocol 1, supra note 5, art. 1.
28. See ýOBAN, supra note 26, at 124-25 (reviewing Article l's drafting history).
29. See id. at 127-37; Helen Mountfield, Regulatory Expropriations in Europe: The Approach of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 136, 146-47 (2002).
30. See Kopecký v. Slovakia, App. No. 44912/98, 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 125, 144 (Grand Chamber).
31. Kechko v. Ukraine, App. No. 63134/00, ¶ 22 (2005).
32. Oneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 127 (Grand Chamber).
33. See •1OBAN, supra note 26, at 152-55 (collecting recent decisions); David Anderson, Compensation
for Interference with Property, 6 EUR. Hum. RTS. L. Rcv. 543, 546 (1999) (same).
34. Kopecký, 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 139-40 (enumeration added).
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rights to social security and pension benefits.3 By contrast, the mere "hope
of recognition of a property right which it has been impossible to exercise
effectively" is not protected, nor is "a conditional claim which lapses as a
result of the non-fulfillment of the condition."3 6 Future interests must also
have a solid basis in domestic law, such as a statute or a judicial ruling that
recognizes their existence.3 7
C. Interferences with Property
If the ECHR determines that a possession falls within Article l's subject
matter and temporal scope, it must then consider whether the government
has interfered with the possession. The second and third sentences of Article
1 recognize two distinct categories of government interferences-depriva-
tions of property and controls on its use."'
Deprivations are the more invasive of these two categories. They include
expropriations, nationalizations, confiscations, and other comprehensive dis-
possessions. The ECHR has avoided finding a deprivation unless the govern-
ment has effectively extinguished the owner's property right. In contrast,
controls on use encompass any lesser restriction on an owner's possessory
interests. The ECHR has adopted "a very broad concept of 'control of use,'
thereby bringing "a wide range of regulatory measures within its jurisdic-
tion. ... 39
D. Assessing the Legality of Interferences
Where a state interferes with a possession, the Court must assess the va-
lidity of its actions. For an interference to be compatible with the Conven-
tion, it must be "provided by law" and pursue "a legitimate aim" in the
35. See IiOBAN, supra note 26, at 152-55 (collecting recent decisions).
36. Kopeck)S, 2004-1X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 140; see also Gratzinger v. Czech Republic, App. No. 39794/
98, 2002-VII Eur. Ct. HR. 399, 419-20 (Grand Chamber). The ECHR has often applied these princi-
ples to complaints seeking restitution of real or personal property seized by socialist governments in
Eastern Europe. The Court has held that former property owners have no "legitimate expectation" of
receiving restitution if they do not have "a currently enforceable claim that was sufficiently established,"
for example because they do not meet "one of the essential statutory conditions" for recovery of previ-
ously owned property or because there is "a dispute as to the correct interpretation and application of
domestic law by the national courts." Rosival v. Slovakia, App. No. 17684/02, para. 75 (2007) (admissi-
bility decision) (internal citations omitted).
37. See Zhigalev v. Russia, App. No. 54891/00, ¶ 131 (2006); Kopecki, 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at
144-45.
38. Hellborg v. Sweden, App. No. 47473/99, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3 [29], 43 (2007) (judgment of Feb.
28, 2006) (explaining this distinction); see also i_OBAN, supra note 26, at 174-86. The ECHR has also
recognized a third category-interference with the substance of property. This category is reserved for
government intrusions that, as a formal matter, "do[ I not transfer the property to public authorities, nor
... limit or control the use of the property ... ." Id. at 187. In practice, however, the Court has not
applied this concept consistently or coherently. Commentators have also noted that the cases decided
under this rubric could easily fit Linder the first two categories. See id. at 189; Anderson, supra note 33, at
551-52. For these reasons, I do not give separate treatment to "substance of property" claims.
39. Mountfield, supra note 29, at 146; see also (tOBAN, supra note 26, at 175-85 (analyzing depriva-
tions and comparing them to controls on use).
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public interest.40 Interferences must also achieve "a fair balance ... between
the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements
of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights."4' Striking this
balance requires "a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means employed" by the state and the objectives it seeks to achieve.4 2
Although this proportionality test is highly fact-specific, the ECHR has
identified several considerations relevant to assessing whether the govern-
ment has maintained the fair balance required by Article 1. These factors
include the owner's reasonable expectations; 43 whether the restriction im-
poses an inequitable or excessive burden (especially on non-nationals);44 the
amount of compensation (if any) paid by the government;45 the uncertainty
created by the regulation;46 and the speed and consistency with which the
state acts.
47
In assessing these factors, the ECHR affords governments considerable
leeway to regulate private property in the public interest. Because states
frequently impose property controls when implementing broader social and
economic policies, "the national authorities"-which have direct knowledge
of their society and its needs-"are in principle better placed than the inter-
national judge" to decide whether a regulation is necessary to achieve those
policies. 48 As a result, the ECHR gives significant deference to "the legisla-
ture's judgment as to what is in the public interest unless that judgment is
manifestly without reasonable foundation. '49 It also stresses the "wide mar-
gin of appreciation" that states enjoy "with regard both to choosing the
means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of en-
40. Jahn v. Germany, App. No. 46720/99, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 49 [1085), 1103-04 (Grand Chamber
2006) (judgment of June 30, 2005).
41. Kirilova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 42908/98, ¶ 106 (2005).
42. L.B. v. Italy, App. No. 32542/96, ¶ 23 (2002).
43. Pine Valley Dev. Ltd. v. Ireland, App. No. 12742/87, 222 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1991).
44. The Court has justified this differential treatment on public choice grounds, reasoning that non-
nationals lack representation in domestic political processes and thus risk bearing a disproportionate
share of the costs of property deprivations. See Lithgow v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9006/80, 102 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 49 (1986).
45. See Tom Allen, Compensation for Property Under the European Convention of Human Rights, 28 MiCH. J.
INT'L L. 287, 298-300 (2007). When the state deprives non-nationals of their property, Article l's
reference to "the general principles of international law" mandates the payment of prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation. Protocol 1, supra note 5, art. 1; Anderson, supra note 33, at 548. By contrast,
Article I does not require compensation to be paid to nationals. Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
47-49. In practice, however, the Court has applied an equivalent standard of compensation to both types
of takings. As a result, where a state deprives its own citizens of their property, it must normally pay "an
amount reasonably related to its value," and its failure to provide any compensation "can be considered
justifiable under Article I of Protocol No. I only in exceptional circumstances." Scordino v. Italy, App.
No. 36813/97, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 7 [207], 239 (Grand Chamber 2006) (judgment of Mar. 30, 2005).
46. Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 4 [52], 108 (Grand Chamber
2007) (judgment of June 19, 2006).
47. Kirilova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 42908/98, ¶ 106 (2005); Broniowski v. Poland, App. No. 31443/
96, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (Grand Chamber).
48. Draon v. France, App. No. 1513/03, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40 [8071, 832-33 (2006) (judgment of
Oct. 6, 2005) (internal quotations omitted).
49. Id.
10
2008 / The New Innovation Frontier? 11
forcement are justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving
the object of the law in question."50
This deference does not, however, amount to a blank check for European
governments. To the contrary, as the docket of property rights cases has
expanded exponentially over the last decade,51 the ECHR has pointedly re-
fused to "abdicate its power of review" and has reserved the final authority
to "determine whether the requisite balance was maintained in a manner
consonant with" the right of property.5 2 As a result of this European judicial
supervision, the ECHR has found an increasing number of violations of Ar-
ticle 1 in the last few years. 53
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION'S
RIGHT OF PROPERTY: A TRIPARTITE
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
In this Part, I apply the general principles reviewed above to cases in
which intellectual property owners alleged a violation of Article 1 of Proto-
col 1. The analysis consists of three questions: First, does Article 1 apply to
the intellectual property at issue, either because it is an existing possession
or because the owner has a legitimate expectation of obtaining a future pro-
prietary interest? If neither type of property exists, the government's con-
duct, however egregious, cannot violate Article 1. In contrast, if the ECHR
answers this question affirmatively, it must consider a second question: Has
the government "interfered" with the possession? The absence of such an
interference also requires a ruling for the respondent state. Conversely, the
existence of an interference leads to a third and final question: Whether the
interference is justified, i.e., has the state upset the fair and proportional
balance that Article 1 requires between the interests of the public and the
property owner's rights?
50. Scordino, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 7 at 239.
51. COBAN, supra note 26, at 258 (stating that over the last decade "both the magnitude and variety
of the applications regarding [Article 1] have escalated significantly and the number of the judgments
rose consequently"). Not surprisingly, this expansion followed the accession of Eastern European coun-
tries to the Convention in the 1990s. These states have faced significant challenges to reallocating prop-
erty rights during their transition from socialist to democratic systems of government. See Tom Allen,
Restitution and Transitional Justice in the European Court of Human Rights, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 13-29
(2006/2007).
52. Jahn v. Germany, App. No. 46720/99, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 49 (10851, 1105 (Grand Chamber
2006) (judgment of June 30, 2005); see also Fedorenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 25921/02, ¶ 29 (2006)
(asserting that the state's "margin of appreciation ... goes hand in hand with European supervision"
which authorizes the ECHR to "ascertain whether the discretion afforded to the Government was
overstepped").
53. Kopeck}i v. Slovakia, App. No. 44912/98, 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 125, 155 (Grand Chamber
2004) (Strrhnick,, J., dissenting) ("In the Court's case-law from 2000 onwards, a tendency may be
discerned to subject the application of national law to supervisory review by the Court."); COBAN, supra
note 26, at 258 (stating that the ECHR has found "more and more violations of [Article 1] in the last
couple of years" and that it "is not as reluctant as it was before to find [a] violation").
Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 49
Analyzing the intellectual property jurisprudence of the ECHR and the
European Commission using this tripartite framework helps to expose the
numerous points of intersection-and of potential conflict-between the
European human rights system and the region's intellectual property laws.
A. Is Intellectual Property Protected by Article 1?
In three decisions dating back to 1990, the European Commission has
consistently held that patents and copyrights fall within Article l's subject
matter scope.54 The Court did not directly address this issue until 2005,"5
when it issued a trilogy of decisions applying Article 1 to intellectual prop-
erty disputes. 56 Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal is the most well-known of
these three rulings. In that judgment, analyzed in detail below, a seven-
member Chamber of the ECHR concluded that "intellectual property as
such incontestably enjoys the protection of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1." 17
The case was reargued before a Grand Chamber of the ECHR in 2006.
Review by this panel of seventeen judges is reserved for disputes that involve
"a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Conven-
tion or the protocols thereto, or a serious issue of general importance.'" 58 In a
judgment issued in early 2007, the Grand Chamber unanimously agreed
with the Chamber's conclusion, holding that Article 1 "is applicable to in-
tellectual property as such."19 The Grand Chamber's statement is more mea-
sured than the language used by the Chamber. Nevertheless, its holding is
an unequivocal endorsement of the view that the right of property protects
the financial interests of intellectual property owners in their inventions,
creations, and signs.
The ECHR's only justification for this conclusion is found in a brief quo-
tation from the European Commission's first intellectual property decision,
in which the Commission stated that
under Dutch law the holder of a patent is referred to as the proprietor
of a patent and that patents are deemed, subject to the provisions of the
54. See Lenzing AG v. United Kingdom, App. No. 38817/97, 94-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
136 (1998) (patent); Aral v. Turkey, App. No. 24563/94 (1998) (admissibility decision) (copyright);
Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87, 66 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
70, 79 (1990) (admissibility decision) (patent).
55. In a 1995 ruling, British Am. Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Netherlands, App. No. 19589/92, 331 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (set. A) (1995), the Court avoided deciding whether patent applications are possessions-an issue I
discuss in greater detail below. See infra Part III.A.2.
56. See supra note 8.
57. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 [836), 856 (Cham-
ber 2007) (judgment of Oct. 11, 2005). I discuss the complex facts and procedural history of the case
below. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
58. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 43.
59. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 [830], 849 (Grand
Chamber 2007). Both the concurring and dissenting judges agreed that Article 1 applies "to intellectual
property in general and to a duly registered trade mark." Id. at 853 (Steiner & Hajiyev, JJ., concurring),
855 (Caflisch & Cabral Barreto, JJ., dissenting).
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Patent Act, to be personal property which is transferable and assigna-
ble. The Commission finds that a patent accordingly falls within the
scope of the term "possessions" in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.60
The Commission's reasoning in this passage is sparse. But it suggests that
the European tribunals place significant weight on the exclusivity of the
exploitation and transfer rights that national laws confer on intellectual
property owners. 61 Inasmuch as these exclusive rights are standard features
of national and international intellectual property systems, it is safe to pre-
dict that the ECHR will treat other forms of industrial and artistic prop-
erty-such as new plant varieties, integrated circuits, performers' rights,
trade secrets, and the like-as "possessions" protected by Article 1. In addi-
tion, because Article 1 applies to fixed claims to future revenue and compen-
sation, 62 the Court will likely extend Article 1 to intellectual property rights
that are subject to a statutory or compulsory license (i.e., a license that au-
thorizes users to exploit protected works provided that they remunerate
rights holders). 63 These logical extensions of prior Article 1 case law suggest
that there are no obvious jurisdictional limits on the ECHR's power to re-
view a wide array of intellectual property disputes under the rubric of the
right of property.
Outside of these broad jurisdictional parameters, however, the scope of
Article 1 is much less certain. This is particularly true where Article 1 inter-
sects with intellectual property subject matter and ownership rules; for ex-
ample, where ownership is contested or where it is unclear whether an
inventor, creator, or business has satisfied the requirements for protection
under domestic law. I analyze these unresolved issues below. I begin with
literary and artistic works that are protected from the moment of their crea-
tion or fixation. I then discuss industrial property whose eligibility for pro-
tection is determined by a registration procedure.
1. Literary and Artistic Works
Consider first an easy case: literary and artistic works whose ownership
and eligibility for protection in domestic law are undisputed. The creators of
such works possess exclusive exploitation and assignment rights that fit
60. Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87, 66 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 70, 79 (1990) (admissibility decision).
61. See LAURENT SERMET, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
13 (1998) ("patents have two characteristics-exclusiveness and transferability-which are also
hallmarks of property").
62. See supra Part 11.1.
63. Compulsory licenses fit easily within the concept of Article I "assets," even where the amount of
compensation is determined ex post by a government agency or royalty tribunal. See Broniowski v. Po-
land, App. No. 31443/96, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 54 (Grand Chamber) (applying Article 1 to a right
"to obtain . . . compensatory property" notwithstanding the fact that the "right was created in a some-
what inchoate form, as its materialisation was to be effected by an administrative decision allocating State
property to" the applicant).
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comfortably within European jurisprudence protecting various forms of in-
tellectual property under Article 1. In these cases of undisputed ownership
and eligibility, the ECHR will simply defer to the national copyright or
neighboring rights laws and conclude that Article 1 is applicable. Yet such
deference may not always yield easy answers, particularly when domestic law
provides limited guidance concerning a creator's proprietary interests.
a. Dima v. Romania
Dima v. Romania,64 a 2005 admissibility decision previously unmentioned
by commentators, highlights these complexities. The case concerned a
graphic artist, Victor Dima, who created the design for a new national em-
blem and seal shortly after the fall of Romania's communist regime in 1989.
Dima developed a preliminary drawing of the state symbols in response to a
public competition. A government commission selected his prototype over
several other submissions and directed him to work with two history and
heraldry experts to revise the design. 65
The Romanian Parliament later adopted the revised design as the state
emblem and seal, listing Dima as the "graphic designer" in a statute pub-
lished in the country's Official Journal. 66 Inexplicably, however, the Parlia-
ment never paid Dima for his work. In addition to seeking to recover the
compensation owed to him, Dima responded by asserting his rights as the
graphic designer of the state emblem and seal.
He turned first to Romania's administrative agencies. The Patent and
Trademark Office refused to register the design, relying on a provision of
Romania's industrial design statute that excludes from protection designs
"whose purpose and appearance are contrary to morality or public policy.'"67
Dima had better luck with the Copyright Agency, whose director informed
him in a series of letters that he was the author of the graphic design and
enjoyed all of the rights in domestic copyright law. On the strength of these
assertions, Dima filed three copyright infringement actions in the Romanian
courts against two private businesses and a state-owned enterprise responsi-
64. Dima v. Romania, App. No. 58472/00 (2005) (admissibility decision).
65. The ECHR does not indicate whether Dima prepared his initial design for the competition, al-
though that is the most plausible interpretation of the facts. See id. at paras. 3-4.
66. Id. at para. 6 ("auteur des maquettes graphiques" in French).
67. The Patent and Trademark Office also based its refusal on an unpublished internal rule which
provided that industrial drawings and models representing the emblem of a state were excluded from
copyright protection ("droit d'auteur"). Id. at para. 9. The ECHR did not explain why an industrial
property office believed itself competent to interpret an issue of copyright law. However, settled grounds
for rejecting the registration of state symbols as trademarks appear in Article 6 ter of the Paris Convention,
which prohibits the registration and use of "armorial bearings, flags, and other State emblems" as such
marks or as elements thereof "without authorization by the competent authorities . i..." Id. at para. 27
(citing Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6 ter, Mar. 20, 1883, 828
U.N.T.S. 305). Although the Patent and Trademark Office did not rely upon this provision in denying
Dima's registration, Romania cited it in opposing his complaint to the ECHR. See id. at paras. 7, 18.
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ble for minting Romanian coins-all of which had reproduced and distrib-
uted the design for profit.68
The courts dismissed all three suits, holding that Dima did not own a
copyright in the design of the state symbols. The decisive rulings were is-
sued by the Romanian Supreme Court of Justice. The court acknowledged
that Dima had personally created the design. But it held that the Parlia-
ment, which had commissioned the revision of the design, was the "author"
of the works. 69 Alternatively, the Supreme Court concluded that "symbols
of the State could not be the subject of copyright," neither under the 1956
copyright statute in effect at the time Dima created the design (which did
not mention state symbols) nor under a revised 1996 statute (which ex-
pressly excluded such symbols from copyright protection). 70 Finally, the Su-
preme Court rejected Dima's argument that the lower courts had
retroactively applied the 1996 statute to his design, since even under the
earlier law Dima was not the author of "works of intellectual creation."
71
Dima challenged these rulings before the ECHR, alleging that the
Romanian courts had deprived him of a possession in violation of Article
1.72 He invoked the subject matter and authorship rules of the 1956 copy-
right statute, which protected "all works of intellectual creation in the liter-
ary, artistic and scientific domain, whatever the contents and form of
expression," including "works of graphic art." 73 The statute further pro-
vided that the "author" of such works "shall be the person who has created"
them and that the copyright "arise[s] the moment the work takes . . . con-
crete form." 74 Dima asserted that, as a result of these statutory provisions,
his copyright in the graphic design arose at the moment he created it or, at
the latest, when he was listed as the graphic designer in the Official
Journal. 75
68. See Dinma, App. No. 58472/00. at paras. 11-26.
69. The Supreme Court emphasized the collective process of the models' creation and the decisive role
played by the Parliament in selecting the final models. See id. at para. 14.
70. According to the ECHR, the 1996 statute was adopted to "modernize the field of copyright"
after the fall of the socialist regime in 1989. See id. at paras. 61-62.
71. Id. at para. 13.
72. Dima's complaint to the ECHR also raised two other claims: (1) the government's failure to
compensate him for his work, and (2) various procedural objections to the domestic infringement pro-
ceedings. As to the first claim, the ECHR ruled that Dima had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, thus
precluding the Court from reviewing his allegations on the merits. Id. at paras. 78-81. As to the second
claim, the ECHR rejected all of Dima's objections save one-a challenge to a report produced by an
expert witness for one of the defendants. As to that issue, it declared Dima's complaint admissible. Id. at
paras. 66-67. In November 2006, the ECHR concluded that Romania had violated the European Con-
vention's right to a fair hearing when the Romanian Supreme Court dismissed his appeal without ad-
dressing Dima's challenge to the expert's report. The Court awarded Dima C2,000 in damages. See
Affaire Dima c. Rounanie, App. No. 58472/00 (2006); see also Press Release, Registrar, European Court of
Human Rights, Chamber Judgments Concerning Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Italy, Lithuania,
Romania and Russia (Nov. 16, 2006) (summarizing the ECHR's judgment in English).
73. Decree No. 321 Relating to Copyright, June 18, 1956, art. 9 (Rom.) (copy on file with author).
74. Id. art. 2.
75. See Dima v. Romania, App. No. 58472/00, para. 38 (2005) (admissibility decision).
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The ECHR began its analysis by stating that Article 1 protects copy-
righted works. But this conclusion did not resolve whether Dima had "a
'possession' or at least a 'legitimate expectation' to acquire a 'possession'" as
the author of the graphic models he created. 76 To assess that issue, the Court
first turned to the subject matter rules of European copyright laws. It ob-
served that "the majority of national legal systems, including that of
Romania, provide that copyright arises upon the creation of an artistic work.
Some jurisdictions require, in addition . . . that the work have a concrete
form of expression."77 These general principles, viewed in the abstract, ap-
peared to support a ruling in Dima's favor.
Yet the Court also recognized that these principles did not answer all
unsettled questions concerning the scope of national copyright law. In cases
where the "existence or extent" of copyright is uncertain, the ECHR stated,
it is the task of domestic courts to resolve any ambiguities.78 Only once
those ambiguities have been resolved can the Court determine the extent of
the applicant's property right and whether the state had violated that right.
The key question, therefore, was whether Romanian courts had decided
that a graphic design of a state emblem could be protected by copyright
prior to the adoption of the 1996 statute that expressly denied such protec-
tion. On this issue, the facts did not favor Dima. Although he was listed as
the graphic designer in the official gazette and the subject matter provisions
of the 1956 copyright law were ambiguous, he could not point to "a judg-
ment in his favor, nor could he rely on any favorable case law concerning the
ability to copyright models of the State emblem and seal. "9 In addition, the
Supreme Court of Justice ultimately rejected Dima's proposed interpretation
of the 1956 statute (and, implicitly, that of the Copyright Agency, although
the ECHR failed to mention this fact). In light of this rejection, Dima could
not claim to have any "legitimate expectation" of acquiring a possession,
since such an expectation cannot arise where there is "a dispute as to the
interpretation and application of national law, and . . . the applicant's sub-
missions [are] subsequently rejected by the national courts. "80
The ECHR concluded by reaffirming its "limited power" to review alle-
gations of legal or factual errors committed by national courts when inter-
preting domestic law. Applying this deferential standard, it found "no
appearance of arbitrariness" in the Supreme Court's ruling. There was thus
"no basis on which the [ECHR] could reach a different conclusion on the
question of whether [Dimal . . . did or did not have a copyright" in the
design he created.8"
76. Id. at para. 87.
77. Id. at para. 88.
78. Id. at para. 89.
79. Id. at para. 91.
80. Id, at para. 92.
81. Id. at para. 93.
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b. Implications of Dima for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
Dima v. Romania raises several important issues regarding the application
of Article 1 to literary and artistic works. Perhaps most significantly, the
ECHR refused to second-guess the Romanian courts' interpretation of do-
mestic copyright law in a case whose facts were sympathetic to the creator.
Instead, it deferred to the authority of national courts of last resort to resolve
contested legal issues that divide lower courts and administrative agencies.
Yet the Court also signaled that its deference to these domestic deci-
sionmakers would not be unlimited. A close parsing of the judgment sug-
gests several issues which may engender more searching scrutiny by the
ECHR in future cases.
First, the ECHR in Dima did not address moral rights, a branch of copy-
right law that enables creators to control the attribution and integrity of
their works. Inasmuch as moral rights protect the personal link between the
creator and his or her intellectual creations, some commentators have argued
that they have a stronger claim to protection as human rights than do copy-
right's economic exploitation privileges.8 2 Scholars are divided, however,
over whether Article 1 extends to moral rights., 3 The Court did not resolve
this debate, inasmuch as Dima's challenge focused solely on his economic
rights in the graphic designs. In future cases, however, creators may raise
moral rights claims, such as where the state misattributes authorship or dis-
torts or damages a protected work.8 4 In such cases, the Court will need to
consider whether national decisionmakers deserve less deference if they re-
strict moral rights.
Second, the ECHR refused to conflate subject matter standards from dif-
ferent branches of intellectual property law. In contesting Dima's allegations
before the ECHR, the government argued against the copyrightability of state
symbols by citing to a trademark provision of the Paris Convention and
Romania's industrial design statute, 85 both of which exclude such symbols as
82. See Orit Fischman Afori, Human Rights and Copyright: The Introduction of Natural Law Considerations
into American Copyright Law, 14 FORMHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 497, 524 (2004) (stating
that "the center of copyright as a human right lies in the moral rights arena"). But see General Comment,
supra note 19, ¶¶ 30-34, 44-46 (emphasizing importance of economic exploitation rights for creators
and innovators and their interdependence with moral rights).
83. Compare ,OBAN, supra note 26, at 149-50 (suggesting that Article 1 covers only the economic
value of a possession), with Geiger, Constitutionalising Intellectual Property Law, supra note 15, at 383 &
n.54 (suggesting that Article I also protects moral rights).
84. Plausible illustrations of such claims include disputes over the government's removal or destruc-
tion of sculptures, murals, or other works of visual art from public buildings or parks. Cf Rebecca Stuart,
Comment, A Work of Heart: A Proposal for a Revision of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 to Bring the
United Stateu Closer to International Standards, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 645, 659-76 (2007) (reviewing
cases decided under U.S. moral rights statute in which creators challenged the government's removal,
destruction, or mutilation of works of visual art, and comparing U.S. law to the protection of moral
rights in international agreements and in other countries).
85. See Dima v. Romania, App. No. 58472/00, para. 80 (2005) (admissibility decision). Dima chal-
lenged the government's reliance on these authorities.
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protectable subject matter.8 6 The ECHR studiously avoided any mention of
industrial property, however, restricting its analysis to copyright law. Had
the Romanian courts relied solely on industrial property principles to reject
Dima's copyright infringements claims, the case's outcome before the
ECHR might have been quite different. A broader implication of this ap-
proach is that the ECHR will interpret Article 1 in a manner that is appro-
priately sensitive to the distinct subject matter and protection standards of
different fields of intellectual property law.
Third, the ECHR signaled in Dima a concern with the retroactive appli-
cation of domestic intellectual property laws. The ECHR recognized that
copyright protection exists from the moment an author creates a work. Had
the Romanian Supreme Court rejected Dima's authorship claim based solely
on the subsequently enacted 1996 statute, the ECHR's recognition of this
rule would have supported a finding that the retroactive application of the
new law interfered with an existing possession. On the facts presented, how-
ever, Dima did not have a reasonable basis for claiming copyright protection
even before the new statute took effect. There was no final judgment, nor
any favorable precedent that recognized the copyrightability of design mod-
els for state symbols. This raises the possibility that the ECHR may find in
favor of authors and rights holders who rely on these legal authorities before
a change in the applicable law.
Fourth, the ECHR did not dismiss Dima's complaint solely on the
ground that he did not own a possession protected by Article 1. Although
the Court emphasized that issue, it also considered whether the Romanian
courts had acted arbitrarily, indicating that the Court was also implicitly
addressing the second issue identified above-whether the government had
"interfered" with a possession.87 Had Dima not been the owner of such a
possession, no amount of arbitrariness by the Romanian courts could have
justified the ECHR in finding a violation of Article 1. The Court's willing-
ness to consider the issue of arbitrariness suggests that in close cases it may
assume arguendo that the complainant has an existing possession or a legiti-
mate expectation in order to correct egregious errors of national courts in
domestic intellectual property disputes.
2. Industrial Property
A different set of ambiguities arises with respect to the ECHR's treat-
ment of industrial property. As mentioned above, the Grand Chamber's
judgment in Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal definitively resolved the question
of whether registered industrial property rights are existing possessions pro-
tected by Article 1. The Court also concluded that applications to register
trademarks are similarly protected, overruling the Chamber's conclusion
86. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing these two provisions).
87. See supra Part II.C.
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that such applications are neither existing possessions nor legitimate expec-
tations. This extension of Article 1 to trademark applications raises several
important issues. I discuss those issues below, but first provide an overview
of the case and the reasoning of the Chamber and the Grand Chamber.
a. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal
The ECHR's judgment in Anheuser-Busch is one small skirmish in a long-
standing litigation war between the American brewer of "Budweiser" beer
and a rival Czech company, Bud&jovický Budvar ("Bud&jovick)$"), which
also distributes beer under the "Budweiser Bier," "Budweiser Budvar," and
similar brand names. Over the last quarter century, nearly fifty disputes
between the two competitors have raged across Europe in industrial property
offices, domestic courts, and regional tribunals.8" These disputes raise diffi-
cult questions concerning the relationship between trademarks and geo-
graphical indications ("GIs")09 and between national and international
intellectual property laws.
The Portuguese legal system confronted these issues in 1981 when
Anheuser-Busch applied to the National Institute for Industrial Property to
register "Budweiser" as a trademark. Bud6jovický opposed the registration,
citing its 1968 Portuguese registration of an appellation of origin 90 for
"Budweiser Bier.'"91 The industrial property office refrained from acting on
Anheuser-Busch's application while the parties attempted to negotiate a li-
censing agreement. Eight years later, in 1989, after protracted negotiations
proved unsuccessful, Anheuser-Busch asked the Portuguese courts to cancel
88. See European Rights Court Rejects Budweiser Bid for Protection Against Rival Czech Brand, 70 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 668, 668 (2005); Jeremy Reed, ECJ Protects Simple Geographical Indications
for their Bud-dy, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. Rrv. 25 (2005); Budweiser Budvar, Disputes Concerning Regis-
tered Trademarks, http://www.budvar.cz/en/web/Znacka-Budvar/Znamka-Budvar.html (last visited Nov.
14, 2007).
89. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) defines a GI as a "sign used on goods that
have a specific geographical origin and possess qualities or a reputation that are due to that place of
origin." World Intellectual Property Organization, About Geographical Indications, http://www.wipo.
int/about-ip/en/about-geographical-ind.html#P16-1100 (last visited Nov. 14, 2007). The TRIPs
Agreement has a similar definition. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, art. 22.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 l.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs].
90. The Lisbon Agreement defines an appellation of origin as "the geographical name of a country,
region, or locality, which serves to designate a product originating therein, the quality and characteristics
of which are due exclusively or essentially to the geographical environment, including natural and human
factors." Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International Regis-
tration, art. 2(1), Oct. 31, 1958, last amended Sept. 28, 1979, 923 U.N.T.S. 205. For a discussion of the
relationship between GIs and appellations of origin, see Felix Addor & Alexandra Grazioli, Geographical
Indications Beyond Wines and Spirits: A Roadmap for a Better Protection for Geographical Indications in the
WTO/TRIPS Agreement, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 865, 867-69 (2002).
91. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 [830), 833-34
(Grand Chamber 2007). The 1968 registration was filed pursuant to the Lisbon Agreement for the
Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration, which was opened for signature
on October 31, 1958. Id.
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Bud&jovickf's registration. An additional six years elapsed before a lower
court ruled in favor of the American company in 1995, cancelling the regis-
tration on the ground that "Budweiser Bier" was not a valid appellation of
origin.92
In the wake of this ruling, the industrial property office promptly regis-
tered Anheuser-Busch's trademark. 93 It was now the Czech brewer's turn to
petition the Portuguese courts, invoking a 1986 bilateral treaty between
Czechoslovakia and Portugal that provided reciprocal protection for each
country's indications of source and appellations of origin. Bud&jovick3 ar-
gued that the bilateral agreement required Portugal to register "Budweiser
Bier" as a Czech GI. But the lower court held that only "(ýeskoBud&jovický
Budvar"-a Czech phrase indicating a beer from (_eskU Bud6jovice, a town
in the Bohemia region of the Czech Republic where the brewer is based-
was an appellation of origin.94 The German name of that town-" Budweis"
or "Budweiss"-and the German translation of the phrase designating beer
from that town-"Budweiser Bier"-were not. 95
An intermediate appellate court reversed this decision and ordered the
cancellation of Anheuser-Busch's trademark. The Supreme Court of Portugal
affirmed. It interpreted the 1986 bilateral treaty to protect each signatory's
national products in translation as well as in their original language.96 The
German translation of (ieskoBud&jovicky Budvar-"Budweiser Bier"-was
therefore eligible for protection as a GI under the 1986 treaty. Moreover, the
refusal to register the American company's mark in reliance on that treaty
did not violate the trademark priority rules in the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs").97
92. Id. at 834. The Lisbon Court of First Instance held that, under the terms of the Lisbon Agree-
ment, appellations of origin were "reserved to the geographical name of a country, region, or locality,
which served to designate a product originating therein . . . . 'Budweiser' did not come within this
category." Id. For a more detailed explanation of this issue, see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
93. Id. Budýjovick5 had filed an opposition to the application to register the Anheuser-Busch mark
with the industrial property office. Notwithstanding this opposition, the office issued a certificate of
registration to the American brewer in June 1995. See id.
94. Id. at 834-35.
95. The translation from Czech to German is not serendipitous. Until the middle of the last century, a
large German-speaking population resided in the Bohemia region of the Czech Republic (formerly
Czechoslovakia and, before 1918, a province of the Austro-Hungarian Empire). According to the
Budweiser Budvar website, "[s]ince the 14th century the official name of [1'esk6 Bud6jovice] was Bud-
weis. Only in 1918 was the name changed into the Czech name of 4ýesk6 Bud6jovice. However, the
indication Budweis is today the official translation of the name of the city into many foreign languages."
Budweiser Budvar, Information About Trademarks, http://www.budvar.cz/en/web/Znacka-Budvar/
Znamka-Budvar.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
96. Anheuser-Busch disputed that the appellation of origin "(ýeskobud&jovický Budvar" corresponds
to the German expression "Budweiser," with the result that, even if the bilateral treaty applied to
translations, it did not support the registration of "Budweiser Bier" as a geographical indication. The
Supreme Court of Portugal rejected this argument. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/
01, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 [846], 848-49 (Chamber 2007) (judgment of Oct. 11, 2005).
97. TRIPs, supra note 89, art. 24. Anheuser-Busch claimed a right of priority for its "Budweiser"
mark application under Article 24(5) of TRIPs, which addresses a subset of the conflicts between geo-
graphical indications and trademarks. Article 24(5) gives priority to trademarks that have been applied
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With the Portuguese litigation at an end, Anheuser-Busch filed a com-
plaint with the ECHR. The beer manufacturer alleged that Portugal had
violated Article 1 by invoking the 1986 bilateral treaty to deny registration
of its "Budweiser" trademark that the company had applied to register in
1981, six years prior to the treaty's entry into force. 98
In their respective judgments, both the Chamber and the Grand Chamber
began by surveying industrial property treaties, E.U. directives, and domes-
tic laws. These sources treat registration as the key to obtaining protection
of a trademark. But they also confer "certain rights" on trademark applica-
tions, such as fixing the beginning of the mark's period of validity and ex-
clusivity. In addition, "in some countries, an application to register a mark
. .. may be the subject of an assignment, security assignment or licence and
(provided the mark is subsequently registered) create an entitlement to com-
pensation in the event of fraudulent use by a third party."99 These rights
notwithstanding, most European states also authorize interested parties to
oppose trademark applications and to bring actions to revoke or invalidate a
mark within a set time period after its registration.100 The key issue facing
the ECHR was whether, in light of this palimpsest of legal rules, Article 1
protects not only registered marks but trademark applications as well.
The Chamber Judgment. By a five-to-two vote, the Chamber ruled that Arti-
cle 1 was inapplicable to the dispute before it.'0 1 The majority offered two
justifications for this conclusion. The first rationale was limited to the case's
complex procedural history. Among the twists and turns of twenty years of
litigation, two events stood out: First, that the American company's right to
use its mark in Portugal "was already contested by Bud&jovický Budvar
when [Anheuser-Busch first) filed its application" in 1981; and second, that
the 1986 bilateral treaty had been in force for more than two years when the
company first challenged Bud6jovickf's GI registration in 1989.1112 As a re-
sult of these events, Anheuser-Busch
for or registered in good faith before the entry into force ofTRIPs or before the geographical indication is
protected in its country of origin. The Supreme Court rejected the American company's claim of priority
under this provision. Anheuser-Busch, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 at 848-49 (Chamber). For a more detailed
discussion of the court's decision, see Antonio Corte-Real, The Budweiser Case in Portugal, 24 EUR. INTELL.
PRoP. Rrv. 43 (2002).
98. Anheuser-Busch, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 at 853-56 (Chamber). The 1986 bilateral agreement en-
tered into force for Portugal on March 7, 1987. Id. at 848.
99. Id. at 852; Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 [8301,
840-41 (Grand Chamber 2007). The Portuguese courts had held that "the mere filing of an application
for registration conferred on the applicant a 'legal expectation' that warranted the protection of the law."
Anheuser-Busch, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 at 852 (Chamber). This expectation was later codified in a provi-
sion of the Portugese Code of Industrial Property-enacted after the conclusion of the domestic litigation
between Anheuser-Busch and Bud&jovick•--that provided "provisional protection" to trademark appli-
cants and authorized them to bring infringement actions on the basis of that protection. Id.
100. See Anheuser-Busch, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 at 854-55 (Chamber); Anheuser-Busch, 45 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 36 at 843 (Grand Chamber).
101. Anheuser-Busch, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 at 858 (Chamber).
102. Id. at 857.
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could not be sure of being the owner of the trademark in question until
after final registration and then only on condition that no objection
was raised by a third party. In other words, the applicant company had
a conditional right, which was extinguished retrospectively for failure
to satisfy the condition, namely that it did not infringe third-party
rights.1 o3
This narrow, fact-specific rationale was sufficient to support the Court's
conclusion that Article 1 was inapplicable. The Chamber went further, how-
ever, holding that Article 1 applies only "after final registration of the mark,
in accordance with the rules in force in the State concerned."' 0 4 Prior to that
time, while an application to register is pending, the applicant has "a hope
of acquiring" a possession. But it does not have a "legally protected legiti-
mate expectation" of a future proprietary interest.10 5
This second, categorical construction of Article 1 easily disposed of
Anheuser-Busch's principal argument-that the Portuguese Supreme Court
had expropriated its property when it invoked the 1986 bilateral treaty to
reject the company's previously filed application to register "Budweiser."
Under the majority's second, broader holding, the court's adherence to the
later-in-time treaty was simply "irrelevant, since, when that Agreement en-
tered into force . . . the applicant did not have a 'possession."' 106
In contrast to the judges in the majority, the two dissenting judges be-
lieved that Anheuser-Busch had a legitimate expectation protected by Arti-
cle 1.107 That expectation was based on the Portuguese Code of Industrial
Property, which conferred three rights on trademark applicants: (1) a right
of priority over subsequent applications, (2) a right to compensation for ille-
gal uses of the mark by third parties, and (3) a right to have their "applica-
tion[s] examined in accordance with the rules" in force when they file an
application.108 The Portuguese courts had interfered with these rights by
refusing to register the "Budweiser" mark in reliance on the 1986 bilateral
agreement.1o9 The refusal resulted in a "total inability to exploit the mark
commercially" in Portugal without the payment of compensation. For this
reason, the interference did not strike a fair balance between the company's
property rights and the general interest." 0
The Grand Chamber Judgment. Anheuser-Busch petitioned for a review of
the Chamber's ruling before the Grand Chamber. The ECHR granted the
company's request, received additional arguments from the parties, and is-
103. Id. at 858.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. id. at 858-60 (Costa & Cabral Barreto, JJ., dissenting).
108. Id. at 859.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 859-60.
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sued a revised judgment in January 2007. By a fifteen-to-two vote, the
ECHR held that Portugal had not violated Article 1. Unlike the Chamber
judgment, however, the Grand Chamber advanced one step further in the
analytical framework outlined above.,' Specifically, the majority held that
property rights in the European Convention apply to trademark applications
as well as to registered marks.112
To reach this result, the Grand Chamber reviewed the "bundle of finan-
cial rights and interests that arise upon an application" to register a mark.
These rights and interests enable applicants to enter into transactions (such
as assignments or licensing agreements) that may have "substantial financial
value."'1•3 The majority categorically rejected Portugal's claim that these
transactions have only "negligible or symbolic value," citing the numerous
rights that domestic law grants to trademark applicants. The economic
value of trademark applications was especially likely in the case of Anheuser-
Busch's "Budweiser" mark, which the ECHR recognized as enjoying "inter-
national renown."'14
The Court next turned to the Chamber's conclusion that trademark appli-
cants possess only conditional rights prior to registration, a status that pre-
cludes their protection under Article 1. The majority acknowledged the
conditional status of the rights that attach to trademark applications. But it
reasoned that
when it filed its application for registration, the applicant company
was entitled to expect that it would be examined under the applicable
legislation if it satisfied the other relevant substantive and procedural
conditions. The applicant company therefore owned a set of proprietary
rights . . . that were recognised under Portuguese law, even though
they could be revoked under certain conditions." 5
The Court thus held that Article 1 was "applicable in the instant case," a
conclusion that made it "unnecessary ... to examine whether the applicant
company could claim to have had a 'legitimate expectation."' 116
111. See supra Part III (introductory paragraph).
112. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 [830], 850 (Grand
Chamber 2007).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. The majority's holding logically implies that trademark applications are "existing posses-
sions," the only other temporal category of property rights protected by Article 1. See supra Part II.B. It is
uncertain, however, whether the Grand Chamber placed trademark applications in this category, since it
stated only that such applications "[give] rise to interests of a proprietary nature." Anheuser-Busch, 45
Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 at 850 (Grand Chamber). In contrast to the majority, the concurrence and dissent
analyzed trademark applications under the rubric of "legitimate expectations." ld. at 853 (Steiner &
Hajiyev, JJ., concurring), 856 (Caflisch & Cabral Barreto, JJ., dissenting).
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b. The Significance of Anheuser-Busch's Extension of Article 1 to
Trademark Applications
Before analyzing the next stage in the Grand Chamber's analysis, it is
worth pausing to consider the significance of the Court's decision to overrule
the Chamber and apply the Convention's property rights clause to
Anheuser-Busch's application to register the "Budweiser" mark. In particu-
lar, the Grand Chamber's judgment raises at least three issues that will af-
fect the future relationship between the European human rights system and
national and regional intellectual property laws.
The first issue concerns the European-wide influence of the Court's rul-
ing. As a formal matter, ECHR judgments only bind the parties to the
dispute. They do not have binding precedential effect for future controver-
sies involving other complainants or respondent states. In practice, however,
many ECHR rulings have transjurisdictional consequences. These effects are
especially pronounced when the Court departs from its normal practice of
resolving cases on narrow, fact-specific grounds and includes general state-
ments of principle in its judgments.' 17
A close reading suggests that Anheuser-Busch is just such a case. Although
the Grand Chamber refers to facts specific to the dispute between the two
brewers, such as the claim that "Budweiser" is a well-known mark, several
asp ects of the decision suggest that the judges intend the case to apply more
broadly. These include the Court's canvassing of international, regional, and
national trademark treaties and statutes; its discussion of the economic value
of trademark applications in a market economy; and the phrasing of its
holding-that "the applicant company's legal position as an applicant for the
registration of a trade mark came within Article 1.""1' The Court's inclusion
of these general principles strongly suggests that its analysis of Article 1
applies to applications to register trademarks in all forty-seven European
Convention member states.
A second unsettled issue concerns the consequences of the Grand Cham-
ber's analysis for applications to register other forms of intellectual property,
such as patents, industrial designs, plant varieties, and integrated circuits.
The Court's twin focus on (1) the priority, exploitation, and transfer rights
that international, regional, and national laws grant to trademark applicants,
and (2) the practical economic value that such applications possess, suggests
that the ECHR will examine these same two factors to decide whether to
extend Article 1 to applications to register other forms of intellectual
property.
117. See Robert Harmsen, The European Convention on Human Rights After Enlargement, 5 INT'LJ. HUM.
RTs. 18, 32-33 (2001) (discussing ECHR's common practice of issuing narrow, fact-specific rulings
rather than broad statements of principle). The most recent past President of the ECHR has urged the
Court to abandon this practice. See Luzius Wildhaber, A Constitutional Future for the European Court of
Human Rights, 23 HuM. RTs. L.J. 161, 162-63 (2002).
118. Anheuser-Busch, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 at 850 (Grand Chamber) (emphasis added).
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The Court's judgment does not expressly delineate the relationship be-
tween the two factors. Its analysis strongly suggests, however, that the legal
recognition of these exclusive rights creates a presumption of economic
value, even if the applicant did not itself assign, license, or otherwise derive
financial benefit from the application.1'9 Thus, to the extent that patent,
industrial design, and similar laws confer such rights upon applications to
register, those applications will fall within Article l's ambit.' 2° By contrast,
if the relevant legal rules do not confer such rights, applicants will need to
prove that they in fact engage in "legal transactions, such as a sale or license
agreement for consideration.'"1 21 Such evidence demonstrates that applica-
tions to register these other forms of intellectual property are "capable of
possessing . . . substantial financial value" even in the absence of formal
legal protection. 122
A third consequence of the Grand Chamber's decision relates to the
ECHR's jurisdiction to review the refusal of domestic industrial property
offices and domestic courts to register trademarks on grounds such as con-
sumer confusion or lack of distinctiveness.' 23 These issues lurked in the
background of the Anheuser-Busch case. The parties disputed whether the
Portuguese courts had rejected the American brewer's 1981 application to
register "Budweiser" not only because it conflicted with the 1986 bilateral
agreement, but also because it was confusingly similar to the Czech brewer's
appellation of origin.' 24 Neither the Chamber nor the Grand Chamber ad-
dressed this issue. But its importance to the parties-and to future ECHR
intellectual property disputes-is easy to explain.
Consumer confusion has long been accepted as a valid basis for refusing to
register trademarks. Had such confusion in fact been the basis for the refusal
to register "Budweiser," Anheuser-Busch could not have argued that Portu-
gal had interfered with its statutory right of priority by enforcing the subse-
quently adopted bilateral treaty. Rather, the American brewer could only
119. The fact that the ECHR did not reference Anheuser-Busch's attempt to license its trademark
application to Bud6jovický Budvar in its analysis of the scope of Article 1 supports this view. See id. at
834 and 849.
120. See, e.g., European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199, art. 67 (defining the
rights conferred by a European patent application after publication) and arts. 71-73 (describing a Euro-
pean patent application as "an object of property" and enumerating rights of applicants including trans-
fer, assignment, and licensing); Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002, Community Designs, 2002 O.J. (L
3) 1, 5, available at http://oami.europa.eu/en/design/pdf/reg2002-6.pdf, art. 12 (term of protection exists
from the date of filing of an application to register a Community design) and art. 34 (describing an
"application for a registered Community design as an object of property").
121. Anheuser-Busch, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 at 850 (Grand Chamber).
122. Id.
123. See Council Directive (EC) 89/104, arts. 3-4, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1 (setting forth mandatory and
permissive grounds for denying registration of a trademark).
124. Compare Anheuser-Busch's claim that during the domestic litigation, "there had never been any
question of a risk of confusion with the Czech company's products," Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal,
App. No. 73049/01, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 [846], 854 (Chamber 2007) (judgment of Oct. 11, 2005)
with Portugal's response that the Supreme Court considered both the risk of confusion and the 1986
bilateral agreement in refusing to register the American company's trademark, id. at 855.
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have complained that the domestic courts had misjudged the reputation and
consumer associations of the two companies' brands in the Portuguese beer
market.
It is here that the consequences of the different approaches adopted by the
Chamber and Grand Chamber are illustrated most starkly. By deciding that
Article 1 is not implicated until after a trademark registration is final, the
Chamber adopted a bright-line rule that categorically precluded the ECHR
from reviewing national court and administrative agency decisions that re-
fuse to register trademarks. By extending Article 1 to trademark applica-
tions (and, as I argue above, to applications for other registered rights) and
holding that Anheuser-Busch was "entitled to expect that [its application]
would be examined under the applicable legislation,"'125 the Grand Chamber
expanded the ECHR's jurisdiction to review the denial of registrations on
any ground recognized in national and regional intellectual property laws.
As I explain below, the ECHR;s review of complaints challenging refusals to
register is likely to be quite limited.126 It nevertheless creates an additional
layer of European human rights scrutiny over domestic, intellectual property
registration systems.
B. Has the State Interfered with a Possession?
After concluding that a particular form of intellectual property qualifies
as an "existing possession" or a "legitimate expectation" protected by Arti-
cle 1, the ECHR and the European Commission must next consider the
second question identified above-whether the state has "interfered" with
such a possession or expectation. The tribunals have identified two distinct
types of interferences: (1) government restrictions on the exercise of intellec-
tual property rights, and (2) interferences that result from domestic intellec-
tual property litigation between private parties. 127
125. Anheuser-Busch, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 at 850 (Grand Chamber).
126. See infra notes 188, 191-192 and accompanying text.
127. The ECHR and the European Commission have also indirectly considered the interference issue
in two other categories of Article 1 cases. In the first category, the tribunals decline to review a claim
under Article 1 if they have already examined it under another provision of the Convention. See British
Am. Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Netherlands, App. No. 19589/92, 331 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 29 (1995)
(refusing to consider Article 1 claim challenging denial of patent application where claim was "in sub-
stance identical to that already examined and rejected in the context of" complainant's Article 6 chal-
lenge to the independence and impartiality of the Appeals Division of the Dutch Patent Office);
Dimitrievski v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 26602/02, para. 7 (2006) (ad-
missibility decision) (refusing to examine alleged violation of right of property where the complaint
under Article I "relate[d) solely to the outcome of the proceedings" and was "in fact a restatement of the
complaints under Article 6").
A second category of indirect interference has arisen in challenges to the authority of the European
Patent Office ("EPO") to review patent applications and register patents. Inventors file applications
directly with the EPO, whose examiners decide whether the applications meet the eligibility require-
ments of the European Patent Convention ("EPC"). If the EPO grants the application, the patent is
automatically protected in all states that have ratified the EPC. National industrial property offices and
national courts may not deny a patent that the EPO has granted nor grant a patent that the EPO has
denied. In four cases, inventors whose patent applications were rejected challenged the state's delegation
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1. Restrictions on the Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights
As explained above, government "interferences" with property rights
take two principal forms: use controls and deprivations. 28 The ECHR and
the European Commission have considered state interferences with intellec-
tual property on only two occasions. In both instances, the tribunals con-
cluded that the government had restricted the exercise of intellectual
property rights-that is, had controlled their use-but had not completely
deprived rights holders of their possessions.
The most recent analysis of use controls appears in the dissenting opinion
to the Anheuser-Busch Chamber judgment. According to the two dissenting
judges, the Portuguese Supreme Court's "refusal to register" the Budweiser
trademark in Portugal "indisputably amount[ed] to [an] interference with
the applicant company's right of property." The dissenting judges rejected
the American brewer's claim that the refusal to register was an expropriation
of its trademark. The state had not deprived Anheuser-Busch of its owner-
ship interest but instead had prevented the company from "exploit[ing] the
mark commercially" in the country.12
9
Fifteen years earlier, the Commission considered whether a compulsory
license issued by the Dutch Patent Office amounted to an interference
within the meaning of Article 1.*30 The government argued that such li-
censes were not interferences because "patents are granted subject to the
provisions of the Patent Act, which expressly limits the scope of the patent
owners' rights by providing for the grant of compulsory licences .... "131
of dcecisionmaking authority to the EPO. In each case, the European Commission rejected the challenge.
The Commission highlighted the numerous benefits of the EPO's centralized review and registration
system and emphasized the EPC's "procedural safeguards," including an appeals procedure staffed by
independent legal and technical experts. In light of these "equivalent protections" for the rights of
patent applicants, the states' delegation of authority to the EPO to review patent applications and regis-
ter patents did not interfere with a possession in a manner proscribed by Article 1. Lenzing AG v.
Germany, App. No. 39025/97, para. 20 (1998) (admissibility decision); Lenzing AG v. United King-
dom, App. No. 38817/97, 94 Fur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 136, 144 (1998) (admissibility decision);
Heinz v. Contracting States also Parties to the European Patent Convention, App. No. 21090/92, 76
Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 125 (1994) (admissibility decision); Reber v. Germany, App. No.
27410/95, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 98 (1996) (admissibility decision). The ECHR has never addressed this
issue, although it recently cited the Commission's case law with approval. See Bosphorus Hava Yollari
Turfzm ve Tkcaret Anonfm ifrketf v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 [1], 32, 45
(Grand Chamber 2006) (judgment of June 30, 2005) (analyzing the delegation of authority by the Euro-
pean Convention's member states to the European Union).
128. See supra Part LI.C.
129. Anheuser-Busch, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 at 859 (Chamber) (Costa & Cabral Barreto, JJ., dissent-
ing). The two judges who dissented from the Grand Chamber's judgment did not discuss whether Portu-
gal's refusal to give priority to the Budweiser trademark was a control of a possession or a more
substantial deprivation of property. They merely concluded that, by applying the 1986 bilateral agree-
ment retroactively, "the Portuguese authorities have objectively caused damage to the applicant com-
pany." Anheuser-Busch, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 at 857 (Grand Chamber) (Caflisch & Cabral Barrero, JJ.,
dissenting).
130. Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87, 66 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 70, 79 (1990).
131. Id.
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The Commission disagreed. It reasoned that "a patent initially confers on its
owner the sole right of exploitation. The subsequent grant of rights to
others under the patent is not an inevitable or automatic consequence." The
Patent Office's decision to grant a compulsory license thus "constituted a
control of the use of property."'' 3 2
2. Interferences Resulting from Litigation between Private Parties
A second category of interference cases arises from domestic litigation
between private parties. It is axiomatic that only states parties to the Euro-
pean Convention can violate the rights and freedoms it protects. The ECHR
thus has "no jurisdiction to consider applications directed against private
individuals or businesses.""' When those individuals or businesses turn to
national courts to resolve their property disputes, however, the decisions of
those courts trigger the application of Article 1.
The ECHR and the European Commission have thus recognized that do-
mestic judicial rulings are a form of state action.' 3 4 At the same time, they
have been wary of treating those rulings as "interferences" with property.
The tribunals have considered the interference issue in three types of intel-
lectual property disputes involving private parties: (1) cases in which na-
tional courts adjudicate contract disputes involving the licensing or transfer
of intellectual property; (2) cases in which national courts reject complaints
alleging intellectual property infringement; and (3) cases in which national
courts resolve competing claims of intellectual property ownership. I analyze
these three categories of disputes below, highlighting the ways in which the
Grand Chamber in Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal expanded member states'
obligations relating to domestic litigation between private parties.
a. Adjudication of Intellectual Property Contracts
"Aral v. Turkey,1' 5 a previously unnoticed admissibility decision, reveals
the tribunals' treatment of the first type of dispute-private contract claims
involving the licensing or transfer of intellectual property rights. In Aral,
the Commission dismissed a complaint filed by three artists who alleged
that Turkey had violated Article 1 when its courts enforced a contract that
governed the rights to cartoon characters that the artists had created.136 The
Commission held that
132. Id. The Commission's conclusion raises the question of whether such a control is justified. I
address this issue below. See infra Part III.C.
133. Reynbakh v. Russia, App. No. 23405/03, ¶ 18 (2005). Only one decision applies this principle
to intellectual property. See MihAilescu v. Romania, App. No. 47748/99, paras. 22-28 (2003) (admissi-
bility decision) (dismissing Article 1 claim by patent owner who was unable to enforce a domestic court
damage award against a state enterprise which had been privatized and later declared bankrupt).
134. See S.A. v. Turkey, App. No. 31138/96, para. 20 (1999) (admissibility decision) (stating that a
transfer of property ownership was "enforced by a court order and thus by an act of a State organ").
135. App. No. 24563/94 (1998) (admissibility decision).
136. Id. at paras. 7-17, 21.
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the case concerns a commercial dispute between private parties. The
State's intervention in the case only occurred through its courts ...
[T]here is no interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of pos-
sessions when, pursuant to the domestic law and a contract regulating
the relationship between the parties, a judge orders one party to that
contract to surrender a possession to another, unless it arbitrarily and
unjustly deprives that person of property in favour of another.1 37
After briefly reviewing the domestic court decisions, which had inter-
preted the contract and Turkish intellectual property law to divide owner-
ship of the cartoons between the parties,' 38 the Commission found no
evidence that "the courts acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner.
Accordingly, there is no shortcoming attributable to the State."' 39
b. Rejection of Domestic Infringement Claims
Melnychuk v. Ukraine exemplifies the ECHR's analysis of the second cate-
gory of private disputes-cases in which an intellectual property owner
challenges a national court's dismissal of its infringement claims against a
third party.140 Melnychuk involved a dispute between a writer and a newspa-
per that published disparaging reviews of his books. The writer asked the
newspaper to publish his reply to the reviews. When the newspaper refused,
the author filed a complaint with the Ukrainian courts seeking "compensa-
tion for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by the publication" of
the critical book reviews. He also claimed that the newspaper had violated
his copyright, although he did not explain the basis for the alleged infringe-
ment.1 4' The trial court dismissed Melnychuk's complaint in its entirety. As
to the copyright claim, the court stated simply that his allegations were
"unsubstantiated." ' 4 2
After exhausting all domestic appeals, Melnychuk filed a complaint with
the ECHR. His complaint included a claim that "the newspaper articles
about his books violated his copyright."'" 43 The Court rejected the claim,
stating that "the fact that the State, through its judicial system, provided a
forum for the determination of the applicant's rights and obligations does
not automatically engage its responsibility under Article 1 of Protocol No.
1." Rather, the state's responsibility in such cases is only triggered in "ex-
ceptional circumstances" for "losses caused by arbitrary determinations."
137. id. at para. 38.
138. Id. at para. 39. The Turkish court held that the magazine publisher owned cartoons which had
been "published or which were unpublished but held in the archives of the magazines." But it also held
that the artists "could continue to draw the same characters . . . in association with other subjects and
stories [and) in other magazines or newspapers." Id.
139. id. at para. 40.
140. See Melnychuk v. Ukraine, App. No. 28743/03 (2005) (admissibility decision).
141. Id. at para. 7.
142. Id. at para. 9.
143. Id. at para. 30.
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Melnychuk's complaint did not meet this high threshold. To the contrary,
"the national courts proceeded in accordance with domestic law, giving full
reasons for their decisions. Thus, their assessment was not flawed by arbi-
trariness or manifest unreasonableness.'"144
The European tribunal's limited scrutiny of national court rulings in
Melnychuk and Aral indicates that challenges to garden variety infringement
and breach of contract actions will rarely succeed. The ECHR did not sim-
ply dismiss Melnychuk's weak copyright claims out of hand, but instead
emphasized the exceptionally narrow scope of review in such cases. This
suggests that the Court will defer to domestic judges' resolution of infringe-
ment and breach of contract disputes even where an applicant's claims have
greater merit. Such an approach is consistent with the European Conven-
tion's core objective-preventing governments and public officials from vio-
lating civil and. political liberties. As stated above, the treaty has no
"horizontal effect" between non-state actors. 4 5 The ECHR will thus only
rarely find fault with "the determination of [property] rights in disputes
between private persons.'"1 46
c. Resolution of Competing Ownership Claims
A third category of Article 1 interference cases arises when national courts
resolve competing claims of intellectual property ownership. This issue arose
in Anheuser-Busch, a case in which the Portuguese courts confronted "the
conflicting arguments of two private parties concerning the right to use the
name 'Budweiser' as a trade mark or [as an] appellation of origin."' 47 As
explained above, the courts ruled in favor of the Czech owner of the appella-
tion on the basis of a 1986 bilateral agreement between the two countries.
The American brewer challenged that ruling before the ECHR, alleging
that Portugal had violated the right of priority attaching to its previously
filed 1981 application to register Budweiser as a trademark.,14
After concluding that trademark applications were protected by Article 1,
the Grand Chamber considered whether the Portuguese courts had inter-
fered with Anheuser-Busch's application to register Budweiser. In analyzing
this issue, the ECHR struggled to knit together two previously unrelated
strands of case law.
144. Id. at para. 31.
145. This contrasts with many provisions of EC law, which have both a "vertical effect (between the
State and the individual), [and] a horizontal effect (between individuals)." Bosphorus Hava Yollari
Turfzm ve Tfcaret Anonfm $frketf v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 [1), 28 (Grand
Chamber 2006) (judgment of June 30, 2005) (internal quotations omitted). It bears noting, however,
that some national court decisions have given horizontal effect to certain provisions of the European
Convention. See Geiger, Constitutionalising Intellectual Property Law, supra note 15, at 384.
146. Voyager Ltd. v. Turkey, App. No. 35045/97, para. 104 (2001) (admissibility decision).
147. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 [830], 852 (Grand
Chamber 2007).
148. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
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One line of decisions concerned "the retrospective application of legisla-
tion whose effect is to deprive someone of a pre-existing asset."'149 The retro-
activity of such domestic laws "may constitute [an) interference that is
liable to upset the fair balance that has to be maintained between the de-
mands of the general interest on the one hand and the protection of the right
to peaceful enjoyment of possessions on the other.""5 " Previously, the ECHR
had applied this principle to interactions between the government and pri-
vate parties.' 5 ' But in the year prior to the Grand Chamber's judgment, the
Court extended the principle "to cases in which the dispute is between pri-
vate individuals and the State is not itself a party to the proceedings.' 152
These decisions provided support for Anheuser-Busch's claim that Portugal
had violated Article 1 by applying the 1986 bilateral treaty retroactively to
its 1981 trademark application.
The American brewer's complaint also intersected with a second strand of
ECHR jurisprudence-cases challenging the interpretation or application of
domestic law by national courts. When confronted with such challenges, the
Court has consistently held that it cannot review errors of fact or law that
domestic judges have allegedly committed. Rather, its jurisdiction is lim-
ited to ensuring that national court rulings "are not flawed by arbitrariness
or otherwise manifestly unreasonable" and that their interpretations of do-
mestic law do not violate the Convention.' 53 To the extent that Anheuser-
Busch's arguments were premised on the Portuguese courts' misinterpreta-
tion of the bilateral treaty and the Code of Industrial Property, the ECHR
had solid jurisprudential grounds for rejecting its complaint.
The Grand Chamber reconciled these two lines of case law by emphasiz-
ing that the retroactive application of the 1986 bilateral treaty was itself an
unsettled issue. Unlike prior decisions in which "the retrospective effect of
the legislation [was) indisputable . . . [and] intentional," the application of
the bilateral treaty to pending trademark applications presented "difficult
questions of interpretation of domestic law."' 54 The complexities of the case
were compounded by the fact that, at the time of the treaty's entry into
force, the appellation of origin was still registered and the parties were at-
tempting to negotiate a license agreement. Given these unique circum-
stances, the ECHR concluded that the Portuguese Supreme Court's rejection
of Anheuser-Busch's claim of priority and its interpretation of the bilateral
treaty were neither arbitrary nor manifestly unreasonable.' 55 As a result, the
149. Anheuser-Busch, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 at 851 (Grand Chamber).
150. Id at 852.
151. See Kopeck• v. Slovakia, App. No. 44912/98, 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 125, 142-43 (Grand
Chamber 2004) (reviewing case law).
152. Anheuser-Busch, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 at 851 (Grand Chamber) (citing Lecarpencier v. France,
App. No. 67847/01, ¶¶ 48, 51, 52 (2006); Cabourdin v. France, App. No. 60796/00, ¶¶ 28-30
(2006)).
153. Id. at 851.
154. Id. at 852.
155. See id.
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Supreme Court's ruling did not "interfere" with the application to register
Budweiser as a trademark and thus did not violate Article 1.
The ECHR's narrow, fact-specific disposition of the case gives broad def-
erence to national courts to interpret intellectual property statutes and trea-
ties incorporated into domestic law. But the Grand Chamber did not limit
its analysis to resolving the dispute between parties. In addition to affirming
the difficulty of reconciling retroactive property restrictions with the Con-
vention, the Court made the following general statement:
[Elven in cases involving litigation between individuals and compa-
nies, the obligations of the State under Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 entail
the taking of measures necessary to protect the right of property. In
particular, the State is under an obligation to afford the parties to the
dispute judicial procedures which offer the necessary procedural guar-
antees and therefore enable the domestic courts and tribunals to adjudi-
cate effectively and fairly in the light of the applicable law.156
The Grand Chamber did not elaborate upon these seemingly basic due
process requirements. As I explain below, however, the Court's statement
has important implications for its future review of intellectual property dis-
putes under Article 1. In particular, the ECHR may interpret these due
process guarantees as requiring member states to provide statutory, adminis-
trative, and judicial mechanisms to enable intellectual property owners to
prevent private parties from infringing their protected works.157
C. Has the State Adequately Justified its Interference with a Possession?
If the ECHR concludes that a possession exists and that the state has
interfered with that possession, it must then consider a third and final issue:
whether the state has adequately justified that interference. The standard for
assessing such justifications is well-settled. Every interference must be speci-
fied by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and achieve a fair and proportional
balance between the rights of the property owner and the public interest.1'"
The European tribunals use this multi-part standard to assess the social poli-
cies and values that underlie state regulations of property. 15 '
1. Dependent Patent Compulsory Licenses
The ECHR has never applied this standard to intellectual property, and
the European Commission has done so only once. In Smith Kline & French
Laboratories, discussed above, the Commission upheld the grant of a compul-
sory license to the owner of a dependent patent to use a previously registered
156. Id. at 851.
157. See infra Part IV.B.
158. See supra Part IL.D.
'159. See 4OBAN, supra note 26, at 195-210.
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invention."' After the company that owned the dominant patent refused to
negotiate a license, the dependent patent owner asked the Dutch Patent
Office to award a compulsory license. The Office issued the license, which
the Dutch courts upheld on appeal.'
61
The dominant patent owner then filed a complaint with the European
Commission, alleging that the compulsory license violated its exclusive ex-
ploitation rights. The Commission agreed that the license interfered with a
possession, but it held that the interference was justifiable and thus did not
violate Article 1.
The Commission first found that the compulsory license was provided by
law-the Dutch Patent Act-and pursued the legitimate aim of "encourag-
ing technological and economic development." The Commission then em-
phasized that "many" European Convention member states restrict a
patentee's exclusive rights to enable "other persons to make use of a particu-
lar patented product or process . . . for the purpose of preventing the long
term hampering of technological progress and economic activity." 162 As to
the crucial issue of proportionality, the Commission emphasized the social
benefits of granting compulsory licenses to dependent patent owners as well
as the protections such licenses afford to dominant patent owners:
[T]he Commission notes that the provision only comes into effect
where such license is necessary for the working of a patent of the same
or later date and the license should be limited to what is required for
the working of the patent. Further, the owner of the dominant patent
is entitled to royalties in respect of each compulsory license granted
under the legislation and receives reciprocal rights under the depen-
dent patent .... [T]he Commission finds that the framework imposed
by the legislation is intended to prevent the abuse of monopoly situa-
tions and encourage development and that this method of pursuing
that aim falls within the margin of appreciation accorded to the Con-
tracting State. The Commission accordingly finds that the control of
use in the circumstances of this case did not fail to strike a fair balance
between the interests of the applicant company and the general
interest ... 163
This short paragraph reveals a fairly sophisticated understanding of patent
policy, especially for a human rights tribunal's foray into substantive intel-
lectual property law.164 It also appears to afford considerable leeway to na-
tional decisionmakers to restrict exclusive rights as a means of furthering
160. See supra Part II1I.1.
161. Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87, 66 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 70, 72-73 (1990) (admissibility decision).
162. Id. at 80.
163. Id.
164. The Commission's decision in Smith Kline was its first analysis of an intellectual property dispute
under Article 1. See supra Part III.B.1 and note 54.
33
Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 49
intellectual property's underlying social functions. As I explain in the next
section, however, several factors limit the precedential value of the Commis-
sion's analysis for future Article 1, disputes over the validity of exceptions
and limitations to intellectual property rights.
2. Other Exceptions and Limitations to Exclusive Rights
First, the Commission's holding is narrow and fact-specific. The scope of
a dependent patent compulsory license is carefully limited to the justifica-
tions for granting it. In addition, dominant patent owners receive considera-
ble benefits in exchange for the diminution of their exclusive rights,
including remuneration and a cross-license to exploit the dependent inven-
tion. Where these benefits are absent-such as for exceptions to exclusive
rights whose substantive contours are more capacious and do not require
remuneration-the ECHR may be less willing to defer to national deci-
sionmakers in striking a balance between private property and the public
interest. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the two dissenting judges in
Anheuser-Busch believed that Portugal had violated Article l's proportional-
ity requirement by failing to compensate the American company for the
refusal to register its trademark application.165
Second, the Commission upholds a limitation on patents that unambigu-
ously protects both the rights of other intellectual property owners and the
public interest in technological progress. The European Convention repeat-
edly refers to rights of others as a justification for limiting civil and political
liberties. 166 The Commission's reasoning therefore suggests that other excep-
tions to intellectual property rights, such as private copying, parody, and
noncommercial uses, are more likely to be upheld if the ECHR interprets
them as safeguards for protecting the human rights of users and consum-
ers-an issue that the Court has yet to address.
The subsequent history of Smith Kline & French Laboratories provides a
third basis for giving limited precedential weight to the Commission's anal-
ysis. Although the Commission rejected the dominant patent owner's Arti-
cle 1 claim, it was more troubled by the assertion that the Dutch Patent
Office was not an independent or impartial tribunal.167 After the Commis-
sion decided to review this claim on the merits, the patent owner and the
Dutch government entered into settlement negotiations. The chief compo-
nent of the state's settlement offer was a pending revision of Dutch patent
law, which vested the civil courts, rather than the Patent Office, with "the
165. See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 [846], 858-59
(Chamber 2007) (judgment of Oct. 11, 2005) (Costa & Cabral Barreto, JJ., dissenting).
166. See European Convention, supra note 2, arts. 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2) (all recognizing "the rights
and freedoms of others" as a legitimate basis for restricting rights).
167. Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87, 66 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 70, 78 (1990) (admissibility decision).
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decision making power for the grant or refusal of a compulsory license.""'8
The amendment also restricted the compulsory licenses for dependent patent
owners to "cases where the dependent, competing patent involves substan-
tial technical progress in the field."'169
The Commission, which reviewed all proposed settlements to determine
whether they manifest "respect for [hJuman [r]ights," approved the parties'
agreement.170 This suggests that its rejection of the company's Article 1
claim was in fact a close question. It also suggests that the Commission was
untroubled by the state's decision to narrow the statutory exceptions to a
patent owner's exclusive rights without considering the social policies un-
derlying such a change in the law. The Commission's approval of the settle-
ment thus leaves unresolved precisely how much discretion national
decisionmakers enjoy to restrict intellectual property in the public interest.
IV. FORECASTING THE FUTURE: THREE PARADIGMS FOR ECHR
ADJUDICATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES
The preceding sections of this Article developed a tripartite framework to
analyze the ECHR's intellectual property case law under Article 1. Such a
framework has three benefits. First, it provides an organizing principle to
explain the relationships among a group of diverse judicial rulings, includ-
ing several decisions that commentators have not previously analyzed. Sec-
ond, it exposes the numerous points of intersection between European
human rights law and international and domestic intellectual property law.
And third, it provides an informed basis for predicting how ECHR intellec-
tual property jurisprudence will develop in the future.
This Part forecasts the evolution of the ECHR's intellectual property case
law in greater depth. It does so by developing and analyzing three para-
digms that the ECHR may apply when deciding future disputes relating to
intellectual property. I label these approaches the rule of law paradigm, the
enforcement paradigm, and the intellectual property balancing paradigm.
These three paradigms, illustrated below with contemporary examples,
provide competing visions of how to conceptualize intellectual property's
place in the European human rights system. Each paradigm finds support in
168. Smith Kline & French Lab. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87, ¶ 11 (1991) (Commission
Report). This revision was later enacted. See Patents Act of the Kingdom 1995, art. 57.4, Stb. 1995 No.
51 (Dutch Parent Act of 1995), available at htrp://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/en/nl/nlO2Oen.html#JD-
NL020_57_4 (authorizing dependent patent compulsory licenses only where "the patent for which the
license is requested represents a considerable advance"). This clause implements a provision of TRIPs
that requires the dependent patent to contain "a considerable technical advance of considerable economic
significance" in relation to the dominant patent. Id. at n.4 (paraphrasing TRIPs, supra note 89, art.
31(l)(i)).
169. Smith Kline, App. No. 12633/87, ¶ 3.
170. Id. Following the Commission's abolition in 1998, the ECHR performs this settlement review
function and applies the identical legal standard. See European Convention, supra note 2, art. 38(0)(b).
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the Court's case law and in the interpretive methodologies that ECHR
judges use to further the European Convention's objectives and values.171
However, the three paradigms have radically different consequences for the
region's innovation and creativity policies. I analyze these consequences be-
low, emphasizing the sometimes problematic effects of overlaying two previ-
ously distinct legal regimes.
A. The Rule of Law Paradigm
Many legal scholars and philosophers recognize the importance of protect-
ing property as a fundamental right, although they differ on the appropriate
justification for and scope of that protection.' 72 As noted above, the decision
to include a right of property in the European Convention was contested and
controversial.173 The drafters did not endorse any single philosophical or
theoretical rationale for property rights. But the history and text of Article 1
reflects a consensus on the basic proposition that protection of private prop-
erty is essential to preserving the rule of law.
The rule of law is a concept that suffuses the entire European Conven-
tion.174 But it is expressed with particular forcefulness in Article 1, which
provides that deprivations of property must be "subject to the conditions
provided for by law" and requires controls on the use of property to be based
on "such laws as [the state] deems necessary.'" 175 The ECHR has interpreted
this dual reference to law as establishing Article l's "first and most impor-
tant requirement"-that "any interference by a public authority with the
peaceful enjoyment of possessions should be lawful. . . . [T]he principle of
lawfulness presupposes that the applicable provisions of domestic law are
sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application.'"176 By
compelling states to regulate property pursuant to previously established
rules with these characteristics, the Court prevents arbitrary and excessive
exercises of government power. 177 The desire to uphold the rule of law also
explains and justifies Article l's application to corporations, since arbitrary
deprivations of property do not affect only natural persons.' 78
171. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (analyzing the ECHR's interpretive
methodologies).
172. See generally JER•EMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1990). For a comprehensive
review of the literature, see (4OBAN, supra note 26, at 35-77.
173. See supra Part II.A.
174. See EMBERLAND, supra note 23, at 44.
175. Protocol 1, supra note 5, art. 1.
176. Edwards v. Malta, App. No. 17647/04, ¶ 60 (2006); see also Zlfnsat, Spol. S R.O. v. Bulgaria,
App. No. 57785/00, ¶ 98 (2006) ("The requirement of lawfulness ... means not only compliance with
the relevant provisions of domestic law, but also compatibility with the rule of law.").
177. EMBERLAND, supra note 23, at 46 ("When the Court invokes the rule of law as an interpretive
argument, it emphasizes its capacity to prevent governmental arbitrariness and the excessive wielding of
public power.").
178. See id. at 44 ("The rule of law also helps explain why corporate persons enjoy ECHR
protection.").
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Under a rule of law paradigm, therefore, the ECHR would treat intellec-
tual property no differently than any other type of real, personal, or intangi-
ble property protected by Article 1. The Court would not consider the
public-good qualities of intellectual property rights, nor would it concern
itself with the social and cultural policies which justify the state's protection
of those rights. Instead, it would find fault only with arbitrary government
conduct, such as ultra vires actions, failure to follow previously established
rules and procedures, or laws that contravene the rule of law principles de-
scribed above.179 The Court's scrutiny of national decisionmakers would thus
be minimal and unobtrusive. It would allow governments unfettered discre-
tion to fashion their domestic innovation and creativity policies as they see
fit, provided that they adhere to previously established rules embodying
those policies.
Does the ECHR believe that intellectual property complaints should be
analyzed under the rule of law paradigm? The Grand Chamber intimated as
much in Anheuser-Busch when it emphasized that it could not "take the place
of the national courts, its role being rather to ensure that the decisions of
those courts are not flawed by arbitrariness or otherwise manifestly unreasona-
ble." 180 Similarly, in Melnychuck, the Court held that providing intellectual
property owners with a judicial forum to adjudicate domestic infringement
claims did not "automatically engage [the state's] responsibility" under Ar-
ticle 1. Only "in exceptional circumstances" could the state "be held re-
sponsible for losses caused by arbitrary determinations. " 181 These quotations
suggest that the ECHR will avoid using Article 1 as a vehicle to review the
micro-foundations of domestic intellectual property laws.
Other than these general statements, however, neither the Court nor the
Commission has considered how the rule of law paradigm applies to intel-
lectual property. But the tribunals have frequently addressed arbitrary gov-
ernment conduct in other property rights contexts. For example, the ECHR
has found fault with a domestic law that authorized an executive branch
official to obtain a court order quashing a final, executed judgment that
restored nationalized real property to its former owner.18 2 It has disapproved
of a statute conferring unbounded discretion on a prosecutor to suspend a
contract to privatize real property.'13 It has criticized the withdrawal of a
banking license without prior notice or a procedure for subsequent adminis-
trative or judicial review.'" 4 It has condemned a state's arbitrary use of su-
pervisory review to quash final judgments ordering it to pay disability
179. See 4ýOBAN, supra note 26, at 196-97 (reviewing case law).
180. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 [8301, 851 (Grand
Chamber 2007) (emphasis added).
181. Melnychuk v. Ukraine, App. No. 28743/03, para. 28 (2005) (admissibility decision).
182. See BrumArescu v. Romania, App. No. 28342/95, 1999-VII Eur. Cc. H.R. 201.
183. Zlfnsat, Spol. S R.0. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 57785/00, ¶ 23 (2006).
184. See Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria, App. No. 49429/99, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 48 [952), 984-85
(2007) (judgment of Nov. 24, 2005).
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pension benefits. 1" And it has found a violation of Article 1 when the evic-
tion and continuing dispossession of a lessee was "manifestly in breach" of
domestic law.1 86
Extrapolating from these cases, it is possible to predict how the ECHR
would apply the rule of law paradigm to intellectual property disputes. Gov-
ernment agencies that themselves infringe intellectual property rights ar-
guably provide the strongest case for finding a violation of Article 1 using
this approach. A ministry that installs copyrighted software on all of its
desktop computers without obtaining a license from the software's owner
provides a ready example. Equally problematic from a rule of law perspective
would be a state-owned enterprise's failure to pay royalties to an inventor
whose patented product or process it had previously licensed.187
Other instances of arbitrary government conduct may involve the judici-
ary. A domestic court that refuses to consider a trademark applicant's plausi-
ble arguments in favor of registration illustrates one possible scenario.', 8
Another involves domestic infringement proceedings that are inexplicably or
inexcusably prolonged, such that the right holder is effectively precluded
from preventing unauthorized exploitation by third parties.18 9 In both in-
stances, the state has failed to provide the minimal procedural guarantees to
which property owners are entitled under the ECHR's conception of the rule
of law.190
The above examples must be distinguished from court decisions that in-
validate a previously registered patent or trademark. It is an inherent feature
of patent and trademark systems that third parties may challenge the valid-
ity and scope of inventions and marks after administrative agencies have
registered them. In fact, roughly half of all patents whose validity is later
tested in litigation are found to be invalid."91 In this sense, registered rights
185. Chebotarev v. Russia, App. No. 23795/02, ¶ 6 (2006).
186. latridis v. Greece, App. No. 31107/96, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, 116 (Grand Chamber 2000)
(judgment of Mar. 25, 1999).
187. Cf MihAilescu v. Romania, App. No. 47748/99, paras. 22-28 (2003) (admissibility decision)
(holding that inability to execute a judgment against a state-owned enterprise that had unilaterally
reduced royalties paid to a patent owner did not violate Article I because the state only owned a minority
stake in the enterprise and thus was not a state actor).
188. Cf Hiro Balani v. Spain, App. No. 18064/91, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (set. A) at 30 (1995)
(finding a violation of the right to a fair hearing where the Supreme Court failed to consider a trademark
owner's argument that its mark had priority over the trade name of a competitor that had successfully
applied to cancel the mark).
189. See Stele v. Slovenia, App. No. 6549/02, para. 13 (2006) (friendly settlement) (approving the
settlement of a complaint alleging a violation of Article 1 by a domestic court for failing to issue a
judgment in a patent infringement action for nearly 11 years).
190. See, e.g., Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria, App. No. 49429/99, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 48 [952), 984
(2007) (judgment of Nov. 24, 2005) (stating that although Article I "contains no explicit procedural
requirements," its provisions nevertheless imply that "any interference with the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions must be accompanied by procedural guarantees affording to the individual or entity con-
cerned a reasonable opportunity of presenting their case. to the responsible authorities for the purpose of
effectively challenging the measures interfering with the rights guaranteed by this provision.").
191. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERaSP., Spring 2005, at 76.
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are always conditional. Although it is therefore accurate to state that if a
patent or trademark "is found invalid, the property right will have evapo-
rated,"'192 the dissolution of that property right raises no Article 1 concerns.
Domestic laws that authorize governments to exploit patented inventions
and copyrighted works without rights holders' consent present a closer ques-
tion.193 On the surface, these statutes appear to authorize wholesale infringe-
ments similar to the software infringement and patent royalty examples
described above. In fact, however, such laws allow governments to use pri-
vate knowledge goods for the public's benefit under previously specified
conditions and for particular purposes.194 Because intellectual property
rights are state-created monopolies, the ECHR should reject rights holders'
challenges to the application of these laws, provided that they are publicly
available and drafted with sufficient prevision to enable rights holders to
predict when the government may use their protected works." 5 By contrast,
the ECHR should find a violation of Article 1 where the state fails to com-
ply with the conditions specified in these statutes, for example by refusing
to pay the required compensation or by exceeding the scope of the privilege.
In summary, the rule of law paradigm has several virtues. It enables the
ECHR to police arbitrary excesses of state power and unambiguous viola-
tions of national law without interfering with domestic intellectual property
systems. Application of the Court's authority in such cases is fully consistent
with the objectives of the European Convention and the shared intent of
Article l's drafters. These disputes thus merit a place on the Court's over-
loaded docket, whether the complaints are filed by individuals or by corpo-
rations. In addition, any violations that the ECHR finds in such cases would
not exacerbate the adverse human rights consequences of overly capacious
intellectual property protection standards.19 6 On the contrary, a state would
be free to either expand or reduce such standards without fear of violating
Article 1, provided that the government did not itself infringe protected
works and provided that the laws were precise, accessible, and foreseeable.
192. Id. at 75.
193. For summaries of such government use exemptions relating to copyright, see, for example, 2
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & PAUL E. GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, GER
§ 8(2)(d)(iii) (2005) (Germany); id. ITA § 8(2)(b)(iii) (Italy); id POL § 8(2)(c) (Poland); id. SWE
§ 8(2)(d)(iii) (Sweden); id. UK § 8(2)(c) (United Kingdom); LiLan Ren, Note, A Comparison of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a) and Foreign Statutes and an Analysis of § 1498(a)'s Compliance with TRIPS, 41 Hous. L. REV.
1659, 1664-69 (2005) (analyzing foreign statutes authorizing government use of patented inventions).
194. See Ren, supra note 193, at 1666, 1669 (reviewing European laws that provide for government
use of patented inventions for purposes of, inter alia, national defense and producing or supplying drugs
and medications).
195. Cf De Graffenried v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 384, 387 (1993) (stating that a patent owner's
rights "do not include the right to exclude the government from using his or her patented invention"
because "the statutory framework that defines a patent owner's rights gives the government the authority
to use all patented inventions").
196. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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B. The Enforcement Paradigm
There is solid support for the rule of law paradigm in recent ECHR juris-
prudence. But the cases also contain a broader vision for the Court's adjudi-
cation of intellectual property disputes. Embedded in the Grand Chamber's
Anheuser-Busch ruling are the seeds of an enforcement paradigm, in which
the ECHR interprets Article 1 to require states to provide statutory, admin-
istrative, and judicial mechanisms that allow intellectual property owners to
prevent private parties from infringing their protected works.
Whereas the rule of law paradigm targets arbitrary government interfer-
ences with possessions, the enforcement paradigm emphasizes the state's
"positive obligations" to protect private property. 197 Positive obligations re-
quire public authorities to take affirmative steps to ensure that rights hold-
ers can effectively exercise their rights. It is the state's wrongful omission,
not its wrongful action, that triggers its responsibility under international
law.198
As applied to Article 1, positive obligations include "provid[ing] a legal
system so that property rights can be enforced."199 For example, the Court
has required states to provide police assistance to landlords seeking to re-
cover possession of leasehold property after the termination of a tenancy.20 0
States must also "afford judicial procedures which offer the necessary proce-
dural guarantees and therefore enable . . . domestic courts and tribunals to
adjudicate effectively and fairly any [property] disputes between private per-
sons." 201 The Grand Chamber in Anheuser-Busch quoted this language almost
verbatim, although it did not acknowledge that it was implicitly referencing
the Court's positive obligations case law. 20 2
The ECHR's application of positive obligations to private intellectual
property disputes is likely to generate a fresh set of complaints challenging
the adequacy of domestic enforcement procedures. These complaints will
require the Court to articulate with greater precision which mechanisms
states must provide to enable rights holders to prevent and punish infringe-
ments by third parties. In determining Article l's implicit affirmative re-,
197. See Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, App. No. 48553/99, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 44 [911], 938
(2004); see also Broniowski v. Poland, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 56 (Grand Chamber).
198. See MOWBRAY, supra note 24; see also CLARE OvEY & ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE, THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 51-52 (4th ed. 2006).
199. (•OBAN, supra note 26, at 164.
200. See Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy, App. No. 22774/93, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 73, 90-92 (Grand
Chamber).
201. Sovtransavto Holding, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 44 at 916 ("[Plositive obligations may entail certain
measures necessary to protect the right of property even in cases involving litigation between individuals
or companies.") (internal citation omitted).
202. See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 [830], 851
(Grand Chamber 2007) ("[T]he State is under an obligation to afford the parties to the dispute judicial
procedures which offer the necessary procedural guarantees and therefore enable the domestic courts and
tribunals to adjudicate effectively and fairly in the light of the applicable law.").
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quirements, the ECHR may draw inspiration from the domestic
enforcement provisions of the TRIPs Agreement. 20 3
TRIPs requires countries to establish "fair and equitable" procedures that
"permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual prop-
erty rights," including procedures to prevent and deter infringements. 20 4
The treaty also contains detailed rules for civil and administrative remedies,
provisional measures, border enforcement, and criminal penalties. 20 5 Tem-
pering these obligations, TRIPs acknowledges that intellectual property en-
forcement measures may vary from country to country depending upon the
resources available for law enforcement in general. 20 6
Several factors suggest that the ECHR may refer to TRIPs when defining
the positive obligation to protect intellectual property. First, TRIPs binds
thirty-nine of the forty-seven European Convention members.20 7 The Court
has held that the Convention "must be applied in accordance with the prin-
ciples of international law," including treaties to which the respondent state
is a party. 20 8 For these thirty-nine countries, consulting TRIPs to interpret
Article 1 would help harmonize the states' treaty obligations. 20 9 Second, the
ECHR has held that the Convention must be interpreted in light of regional
and international trends in law and social policy.210 Thus, even for countries
that are not World Trade Organization ("WTO") members, the ECHR may
203. As a formal matter, TRIPs protects only foreign intellectual property owners, whereas Article I
protects the owners of all possessions regardless of nationality. As a political and practical matter, how-
ever, states rarely protect foreign intellectual property owners without extending equivalent protections
to domestic creators, innovators, and businesses. See Heifer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims, supra note 1, at
367 & n.38. As a result, the formal differences in scope between the two treaties are unlikely to deter the
ECHR from consulting TRIPs when fashioning Article I positive obligations.
204. TRIPs, supra note 89, arts. 41(l)-(2).
205. Id. arts. 42-51, 61. These provisions have resulted in substantial changes to domestic enforce-
ment procedures in many countries. See Jerome H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures of the
TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 335 (1997).
206. TRIPs, supra note 89, art. 41(5). For a detailed analysis of how WTO dispute settlement panels
might draw on ECHR jurisprudence to interpret TRIPs' enforcement obligations, see Heifer, Adjudicat-
ing Copyright Claims, supra note 1, at 416-20.
207. See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization-Members and
Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto._.e/whatis e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2007);
Council of Europe, Member States of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=
2/23/2007&CL=ENG (last visited Nov. 14, 2007). The eight European Convention members who have
not yet ratified the WTO Agreement are Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, the
Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, and Ukraine. Id.
208. Guichard v. France, App. No. 56838/00, 2003-X Eur. Cr. H.R. 419, 431 (admissibility deci-
sion); see also Paradis v. Germany, App. No. 4783/03 (2004) (judgment of May 15, 2003) (admissibility
decision).
209. The case for using TRIPs as a benchmark is strengthened by the fact that both treaties require
states to use practical effective enforcement mechanisms to protect intellectual property rights. Compare
TRIPs, supra note 89, art. 41(1) (TRIPs enforcement provisions aim "to permit effective action against
any act of infringement of intellectual property rights"), with Artico v. Italy, App. No. 6694/74, ¶ 33
(1980) (holding that "the Convention is intended to guarantee . . . rights that are practical and
effective").
210. See Alastair Mowbray, The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
57, 60-71 (2005).
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consult TRIPs to elucidate the domestic enforcement mechanisms that Arti-
cle 1 requires.
To be sure, the Court is unlikely to incorporate every nuance of TRIPs
into Article 1, especially in cases involving countries that are not WTO
members. Rather, the ECHR would use the treaty as a rough benchmark to
aid it in fashioning minimum enforcement standards that respect "the fair
balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the community
and the interests of the individual" and that do not "impose an impossible
or disproportionate burden on the authorities.'"21 1
Aware of the helpful analogies that TRIPs provides, rights holders are
likely to invoke the treaty in three types of Article 1 enforcement cases.
First, rights holders may contest the remedies awarded in individual. in-
fringement proceedings, even where a domestic legal system in the aggre-
gate satisfies the Convention's rule of law requirements. These challenges are
unlikely to succeed. Disputes over issues such as the amount of damages, the
denial of injunctive relief, or the failure to impound infringing articles are
precisely the sort of case-specific applications of domestic law with which
the ECHR rarely finds fault.212 In addition, nothing in TRIPs limits the
discretion of national courts to tailor remedies to the facts and circumstances
of individual disputes.2 13  Only in extraordinary cases, such as where national
courts refuse to award a remedy mandated by domestic law, might the
ECHR plausibly intervene.
A second category of cases concerns a state's failure to provide one of the
enforcement measures that TRIPs requires. 21 4 In the late 1990s, for exam-
ple, the United States successfully challenged the lack of ex parte civil reme-
dies in Denmark and Sweden. 215 Most European countries now authorize ex
parte orders. 216 Some intellectual property owners claim, however, that the
procedures for obtaining these orders are "unnecessarily complicated" and
"costly" in some jurisdictions. These claims could be refashioned as argu-
ments that the states concerned have failed to provide the effective enforce-
ment measures required by Article 1.
The third and most serious non-enforcement claim concerns the wholesale
failure to prevent private infringements of intellectual property. Cases of
this nature target pervasive, systemic defects in civil, administrative, or
criminal procedures which prevent intellectual property owners from enforc-
211. OzgGir G(indem v. Turkey, App. No. 23144/93, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 21.
212. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
213. Cf eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (emphasizing the discretionary
nature of injunctive relief in patent infringement cases).
214. See INT'L INTELL. PROP. ALLIANCE, COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE TRIPs AGREEMENT 5
(2004) (summarizing in chart form the TRIPs deficiencies found in national copyright laws and enforce-
ment practices), available at http://www.iipa.com/rbi/2004_Oct19_TRIPS.pdf.
215. See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Denmark-Measures Affecting the Enforcement of In-
tellectual Property Rights, WTiDS83/2 (June 13, 2001); Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Swe-
"den-Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS86/2 (Dec. 11, 1998).
216. See INT'L INTELL. PROP. ALLIANCE, supra note 214, at 3.
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ing their rights. Such system-wide enforcement deficiencies exist principally
(although by no means exclusively) in Eastern Europe.21 7 Piracy and coun-
terfeiting in the Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey are especially flagrant. 21 8
The ECHR recently established a "pilot judgment procedure" that is well
suited to redressing widespread piracy of intellectual property rights. Under
this new class-action mechanism, the Court adjudicates a single case that
represents a large number of similar human rights claims, and it uses the
case to develop systemic reforms for the entire class. The ECHR first applied
the procedure in a 2004 decision affecting nearly 80,000 real property
claimants in Poland. 21 9 It later approved a settlement of the dispute, but
only after the state had enacted legislation to prevent future Article 1 viola-
tions and provide remedies to all affected property owners.220 The case pub-
licized the Court's determination to scrutinize systemic problems that affect
large numbers of similarly situated property owners. 221
Intellectual property rights holders could invoke the pilot judgment pro-
cedure if they are unable, after reasonable diligence, to protect their works
within a respondent state's territory. If rights holders prove that piracy in
the jurisdiction is pervasive, the ECHR could require the government to
adopt system-wide reforms. Depending on the nature and scope of the viola-
tions, such measures could include enacting domestic legislation, streamlin-
ing judicial procedures, or allocating additional resources to criminal or
217. See Ed Bates, Supervision of the Execution ofJudgments Delivered by the European Court of Human
Rights: The Challenges Facing the Committee of Ministers, in EUROPEAN COURT OP HUMAN RIGHT-s: REME-
DIES AND EXECUTION Or JUDGMENTS 49, 84-96 (Theodora Christou & Juan Pablo Raymond eds., 2005)
[hereinafter ECHR REMEDIES] (describing systemic and structural problems, including lack of resources,
infrastructure, and slow or corrupt domestic judicial processes, leading to widespread violations of the
European Convention in Turkey and in several Eastern European countries).
218. According to a recent report, the deficiencies include the "lack of an effective and deterrent
criminal enforcement system . . , the lack of effective plant inspection [for optical media production and
distribution] . . ; the lack of civil ex parte search procedures; an extremely porous border; delays in
criminal prosecutions and adjudications; and infrequent destruction of seized pirate goods." OIzmcEi ov
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2005 SP1.CIAL 301 REPORT 32 (2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/Document.Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005 Special 301/asset-upload-file195-7636.
pdf; see also id. at 24 (highlighting the need for Ukraine to "deter( I optical media piracy through
adequate enforcement"), 33 (highlighting "concerns over patent protection, copyright piracy, trademark
counterfeiting, and IPR enforcement problems" in Turkey). Not coincidentally, both Russia and Ukraine
have yet to be admitted to the WTO, in part because of their poor record of enforcing intellectual
property rights. See Gary G. Yerkey, Russia Needs to Do 'Much More' Before U.S. Will Sign Off On WTO
Accession Agreement, 6 WTO REP. (BNA) No. 184 (Sept. 22, 2006).
219. Broniowski v. Poland, App. No. 31443/96, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 76 (Grand Chamber). The
Article 1 violations in this case concerned the state's failure to meet its positive obligations and its
interference with property rights. Id. at 57.
220. Broniowski v. Poland, App. No. 31443/96, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 [1], 19-20 (Grand Chamber
2006) (judgment of Sept. 28, 2005) (friendly settlement).
221. See Philip Leach, Beyond the Bug River-A New Dawn for Redress Before the European Court ofsHuman
Rights, 10 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 148 (2005). The Court has since issued a pilot judgment involving
an even larger number of property claimants. See Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, 45 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 4 [521 (Grand Chamber 2007) (judgment of June 19, 2006) (holding that domestic legisla-
tion which prevented 100,000 landlords from raising rents to cover property maintenance for between
600,000 and 900,000 tenants violated Article 1).
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administrative enforcement actions. Here too the ECHR may turn to TRIPs'
enforcement provisions for guidance in fashioning appropriate systemic rem-
edies, although the Court should also be mindful of the statement that noth-
ing in the agreement "creates any obligation with respect to the distribution
of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the
enforcement of law in general. "222
Should the ECHR endorse the enforcement paradigm described above?
The arguments in favor of its doing so are equivocal. On the one hand, once
a government has recognized exclusive rights in knowledge goods, the own-
ers of Article 1 possessions can reasonably expect that government to pro-
vide the means to prevent and punish infringements by third parties. This
expectation is bolstered where the state is a WTO member and has accepted
the obligation to conform its domestic laws to TRIPs. In addition, once a
state has incorporated intellectual property enforcement mechanisms into its
domestic legal system, rights holders can reasonably expect it to devote suf-
ficient resources to make those mechanisms practical and effective.
Yet the enforcement paradigm also raises troubling issues. The first re-
lates to the different judicial access rules of the WTO and the ECHR. In the
WTO dispute settlement system, only states can file complaints alleging
violations of TRIPs. This limitation on WTO standing acts as a key politi-
cal filter that limits the number and type of TRIPs controversies 223 and
colors how disputes are resolved. 224
The enforcement paradigm bypasses this political filter by allowing pri-
vate parties to litigate breaches of TRIPs' enforcement provisions in the
guise of violations of Article l's positive obligations. As the years of cease-
less judicial battles between Anheuser-Busch and Budýjovický Budvar illus-
trate, many businesses have the incentive and the means to litigate in every
222. TRIPs, supra note 89, art. 41(5).
223. See Alan 0. Sykes, Public Verus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and
Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631 (2005) (analyzing "political filters" that allow states to limit WTO
litigation to disputes that produce joint welfare gains). In the intellectual property context, governments
litigate only a subset of TRIPs disputes that rights holders bring to their attention. In some cases, a state
may decline to file a complaint because it fears a WTO countersuit. In others, it may refuse to do so
because the probability of success is low or because victory will only marginally benefit domestic indus-
tries. In still others, geostrategic factors unrelated to trade or intellectual property may lead governments
to refrain from litigating. In each instance, the "decision whether to challenge a practice of a member
may be made only by another member government, not by the private party who is directly aggrieved by
that practice." Judith H. Bello, Some Practical Observations About WTO Settlement of Intellectual Property
Disputes,'37 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 358 (1997).
224. When governments do file TRIPs complaints, they often prefer a politically palatable settlement
or an ambiguous panel decision to a definitive WTO Appellate Body ruling. Such compromises allow
both sides to claim victory and resolve the litigation in ways that both states are willing to accept. See
Notification of a Mutually Satisfactory Temporary Arrangement, United States-Section 110(5) of the US
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/23 (June 26, 2003) (notifying WTO of lump-sum payment by United States
to the EC to settle TRIPs copyright dispute in which the EC prevailed); see also Eva Gurierrez, Geographi-
cal Indicators: A Unique European Perspective on Intellectual Property, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
29, 48-49 (2005) (stating that both the United States and the EC claimed victory and did not appeal a
WTO panel decision partially invalidating EC protection of GIs).
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available forum. The ECHR's adoption of the enforcement paradigm would
thus presage an increase in litigation of intellectual property enforcement
disputes framed as human rights complaints, including cases that, under the
current system, would not have been litigated or would have been resolved
through politically palatable settlements. It is highly questionable whether
these cases warrant a place on the Court's already overcrowded docket.
A second concern of the enforcement paradigm relates to the dissimilar
remedies that the WTO and the ECHR award. Although both tribunals
recommend responses for states that have violated their treaty commitments,
the ECHR's remedial powers are more expansive. Its recent judgments have
included recommendations to reopen closed court proceedings, revise do-
mestic statutes, and award restitution in kind. 225 In addition, the ECHR
awards "just satisfaction" to "injured parties. "226 Damage awards are usu-
ally less than C10,000, and the Court has discretion to award no monetary
relief. In property rights cases, however, pecuniary damage awards "can as-
sume gigantic proportions," the largest on record being nearly $31 mil-
lion. 227 Governments have promptly paid these sums in all but a handful of
cases.
2 28
The ECHR's award of these remedies when states violate Article l's posi-
tive obligations could impose significant constraints on national legal sys-
tems. If countries do not adopt the remedies that the Court recommends,
injured rights holders could file complaints with the Court seeking compen-
sation. In addition, under the new pilot judgment procedure described
above, the ECHR could recommend systemic -reforms benefiting all simi-
larly situated rights holders. In counterfeiting and piracy cases, for example,
the Court may award large monetary awards to an entire class of rights hold-
ers if states do not improve their judicial procedures. 229 These concerns sug-
gest, on balance, that the ECHR should avoid interpreting Article 1 to
enable intellectual property owners to challenge the adequacy of domestic
enforcement mechanisms.
225. See Leach, supra note 221, at 149-51 (describing evolution of ECHR's approach to remedies).
226. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 41.
227. Marius Emberland, Compensating Companies for Non-Pecuniary Damage: Comingersoll S.A. v. Por-
tugal and the Ambivalent Expansion of the ECHR Scope, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 409, 412 (2003); see also
ýOBAN, supra note 26, at 228. In addition, the ECHR has "awarded monetary compensation for moral
injury in almost all of the property cases where it found (a] violation of" Article 1. Id. at 230. Moral
damage suffered by corporations includes harm to business reputation, uncertainty in future planning,
disruption in management, and inconvenience to directors and officers. EMBERLAND, supra note 23, at
132.
228. Bates, supra note 217, at 74 ("['1n the vast majority of instances settlement is made, at the latest,
within six months of the date clue for payment expired.").
229. See Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 4 [52), 139 (Grand
Chamber 2007) (judgment of June 19, 2006) (Zupan&iý, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that judgment finding a violation of Article 1 in a pilot judgment case "bind[s] the state to
indemnify all similarly situated rights holders").
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Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 49
C. The Intellectual Property Balancing Paradigm
If the merits of the enforcement paradigm are at best ambiguous, the
Court's adoption of an intellectual property balancing paradigm would have
indisputably negative consequences for innovation and creativity law and
policy. Such deleterious effects would result from the ECHR's inevitably ad
hoc interventions at the upper and lower boundaries of intellectual property
protection standards. Under the balancing paradigm, the ECHR would in-
terpret the European Convention to impose both a floor and a ceiling on
domestic intellectual property rights. The Court would police the lower
limit of protection by reviewing whether the government's diminution of
exclusive rights or expansion of exceptions and limitations satisfies Article
l's fair and proportional balance standard.230 And it would police the upper
boundary by assessing whether expansions of exclusive rights or restrictions
on exceptions and limitations violate other European Convention provisions,
such as freedom of expression and the right of privacy. 231
The intellectual property balancing paradigm finds some support in re-
cent European human rights jurisprudence. With respect to Article 1, the
Court in both Anheuser-Busch and Dima suggested that retroactive laws that
deprive intellectual property owners of an existing asset may violate Article
1. This concern extends not only to interactions between the state and rights
holders, but also to disputes between private parties. 23 2
With respect to other human rights, the ECHR recently decided a string
of cases challenging the Austrian Copyright Act's ban on public dissemina-
tion of "[plortraits of persons" that cause injury to "the legitimate interests
of the persons portrayed.'"23 3 In each case, the Court held that injunctions
prohibiting newspapers from publishing photographs of politicians or indi-
viduals involved in matters of public interest violated the right to freedom
of expression. 234 In reaching this result, the ECHR stated that freedom of
expression "protects not only the substance of ideas and information but also
230. See supra Part II.D.
231. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 10(1) ("Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right shall include freedom to . . . receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers."); id. art. 8(1) ("Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.").
232. See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eut. H.R. Rep. 36 [830] (Grand
Chamber 2007); Dima v. Romania, App. No. 58472/00, paras. 87-92 (2005) (admissibility decision).
233. Urheberrechtgesetz-UrhG. Bundesgesetz (iber das Urheberrecht an Werken der Literatur und
der Kunst und Oiber verwandte Schutzrechte [UrhG] [Federal Law on Copyright in Works of Literature
and Art and on Related Rights) BOrgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB1] No. 111/1936, § 78 (1) (Austria)
("Portraits of persons may not be exhibited or otherwise distributed in a manner which would make
them available to the public if legitimate interests of the person portrayed, or, should he have died
without authorizing or ordering the publication of the portrait, of a close relative would be prejudiced.").
234. See, e.g., Osterreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria, App. No. 35841/02, ¶¶ 72-73 (2006); Verlag-
sgruppe News GmbH v. Austria (No. 2), App. No. 10520/02, ¶ 29 (2006); Krone Verlags GmbH & Co
KG v. Austria, App. No. 34315/96, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 57 [1059], 1066 (2003) (judgment of Feb. 26,
2002); News Verlags GmbH & CoKG v. Austria, 2000-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 157, 174-75.
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the form in which they are conveyed. " 235 The Court also conducted a de-
tailed and fact-intensive balancing analysis, weighing the interests of the
individuals whose images were disseminated against the media's interest in
conveying information to the public.
236
Several predictions follow from these two lines of decisions. The first con-
cerns retroactive restrictions of property rights. When governments revise
intellectual property protection standards, they generally apply the revisions
to works already in existence as well as to those yet to be created.23 7 Where
such modifications reduce the level of protection, they may upset rights
holders' reasonable expectations and investments made in reliance on the
prior legal regime.238 Although expansions of exclusive rights have received
the lion's share of attention in recent years,2 39 contractions are more wide-
spread than is commonly believed.
Consider a few examples of diminutions of intellectual property protec-
tion standards that apply to pre-existing works. Belgium recently intro-
duced a new research exemption and a compulsory license for public health
uses of biotechnology patents. 240 The United Kingdom eliminated perpetual
protection for unpublished copyrighted works in 1989.241 Germany and
Belgium amended their copyright statutes to implement a 2001 EC Direc-
tive on the harmonization of copyright. 242 The new laws authorize users "to
demand from the right holder any support required for the exercise of cer-
tain legitimate uses. This means that if a technical measure hinders a user in
a use permitted by law, the user can ask a judge to enforce his
limitation. "243
235. Verlagsgruppe News GmbH, App. No. 10520/02, ¶ 29.
236. See News Verlags GmbH, 2000-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 175-77; Osterreichischer Rundfunk, App. No.
35841/02, $9 62-73; Verlagsgruppe News GmbH, App. No. 10520/02, ¶9 34-44.
237. Nothing in Article I or ECHR case law prohibits governments from limiting diminutions of
intellectual property protection standards to inventions, creations, and signs that have yet to be created.
In practice, however, states rarely limit protection in this way.
238. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights: Where Is the Paradox?, Molengrafica
Series, at 9 n. 4 3 (2006) (unpublished), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
929498 (arguing against protecting patents as human rights but stating that "there is a grey area where
investments made in reliance on a particular scheme of patent protection are frustrated by a change in
regime; whether the change amounts to a taking of property is arguably a hard question").
239. See id. at 9-12.
240. See Geertruii Van Overwalle, The Implementation of the Biotechnology Directive in Belgium and Its
After-Effects, 37 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 889, 905-18 (2006) (describing the scope of the
exemption and compulsory license in Belgium).
241. See R. Anthony Reese, The New Property, 85 TEx. L. REV. 585, 608 (2007). The law provides a
50-year transition period so that works unpublished in that year date will be protected until the end of
2039.
242. Council Directive 2001/29/EC, pmbl., 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 11. The Act of May 22, 2005
amended Belgium's copyright legislation to implement the directive. See I MELVILLE B. NIMMER & PAUL
E. GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, BEL § I (BELGIUM). THE Amendment of
Sept. 10, 2003 implemented the directive in Germany. See NiMMER & GELLER, supra note 193, GER § I
(GERMANY).
243. Christophe Geiger, Copyright and Free Access to Information: For a Fair Balance of Interests in a
Globalised World, 28 EUR. INTELL. PROP. Rev. 366, 370 & n.4 4 (2006)
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As applied to pre-existing works, each of these statutory revisions inter-
feres with an existing possession and thus raises the retroactivity concerns
identified by the Grand Chamber in Anheuser-Busch. If rights holders chal-
lenge these laws as violating Article 1, the ECHR would need to address the
third and most difficult issue in the tripartite framework developed above:
whether the laws strike a fair and proportional balance between the rights of
intellectual property owners and the broader public interest. 2"4
This inquiry raises questions whose answers have important systemic con-
sequences. For example, what is the relationship between the fair and pro-
portional balance standard and the "three-step test" that .TRIPs uses to
regulate exceptions and limitations in national copyright, patent, and trade-
mark laws? 24 5 If the Article 1 standard is more lenient than the three-step
test, rights holders whose coiýiplaints are rejected by the ECHR could peti-
tion their governments to challenge the exceptions as a violation of TRIPs,
taking what is, in effect, an appeal from the ECHR to the WTO. If the
Article 1 standard is more restrictive than the three-step test, rights holders
will have an incentive to challenge exceptions and limitations before the
ECHR, bypassing the WTO dispute settlement system's political filters246
and adding more cases to the Court's docket. Even if Article 1 and the three-
step test impose equivalent restrictions, their substantive standards will un-
doubtedly differ. This will create complexity and uncertainty for both rights
holders and users and increase opportunities for protracted, duplicative liti-
gation and forum shopping.
These problems will only be compounded if the ECHR invokes other
individual liberties to establish an upper human rights boundary on intellec-
tual property protection standards. Although a detailed treatment of these
issues is beyond the scope of this article, recent national court rulings and
the writings of commentators suggest the kinds of cases that the ECHR may
soon face.247 As one scholar has predicted:
Not all European countries have successfully limited intellectual property protection standards. In
France, for example, a draft law implementing the EC Directive initially included a provision requiring
Apple Computer to license its FairPlay digital rights management for use in devices that compete with
its highly successful iPod. The Constitutional Council declared the provision to violate the right of
property in the French Constitution. Crampton, supra note 20, at C9; Charles Jade, Parts of French "iPod
Law" Ruled Unconstitutional, ARs TECHNICA, July 29, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/200607
29-7380.html. French courts are widely known for their strong support for authors' rights. Hugenholcz,
supra note 22, at 357. A similar law in a different jurisdiction might well survive a constitutional chal-
lenge, paving the way for rights holders to file a complaint with the ECHR.
244. See supra Parts lI.D & III.C.
245. For example, Article 13 of TRIPs confines exceptions and limitations to copyright to "certain
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder." TRIPs, supra note 89, art. 13; see also id. art. 17
(trademark), art. 30 (patent).
246. See Sykes, supra note 223 (discussing how the restriction of judicial access to states functions as a
political filter on WTO dispute settlement).
247. See Geiger, Constitutionalising Intellectual Property Law, supra note 15, at 394-96 (discussing court
decisions from Austria, the Netherlands, and Germany in which freedom of expression and the public's
right to information prevailed over claims for protection by copyright and trademark owners).
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[F]reedom of expression arguments are likely to succeed against copy-
right claims aimed at preventing political discourse, curtailing journal-
istic or artistic freedoms, suppressing publication of government-
produced information or impeding other forms of "public speech." In
practice, this might imply that the [ECHR] would be willing to find
violations of Article 10 [protecting the right to freedom of expression]
if national courts fail to interpret broadly or "stretch" existing copy-
right limitations to permit quotation, news reporting, artistic use or
reutilization of government information. The Court might also be will-
ing to find national copyright laws in direct contravention of Article
10 if they fail to provide exceptions for uses such as parody. 248
There are several reasons to be concerned about the ECHR imposing up-
per and lower limits on intellectual property protection standards. First, the
rights and freedoms in the European Convention, even when viewed collec-
tively, do not provide a coherent blueprint for the Court to undertake such a
sensitive and policy-laden function. Unlike the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights24 9 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 25 ° the Convention does not contain a single provision that
expressly balances the rights of authors and inventors25' against the public's
right to benefit from the scientific and cultural advances that knowledge
goods can engender. 25 2 In the absence of such a provision, the ECHR's inter-
ventions at the upper and lower boundaries of protection will inevitably be
ad hoc. They also create a risk of both underprotection and overprotection,
depending on the vagaries of which cases are filed, in what order, and how
the Court extends its jurisprudence over time.2 5 3
Second, and more fundamentally, the European Convention does not pro-
vide a mechanism to address the utilitarian and social welfare arguments
that are central to intellectual property law and policy. 25 4 If the ECHR
248. Hugenholtz, jupra note 22, at 362.
249. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
250. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 15(1)(b), 15(1)(c), Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCRI.
251. UDHR, supra note 249, art. 27(2) ("Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the
author."); ICESCR, supra note 250, art. 15(0)(c) (recognizing the same right in nearly identical
language).
252. ICESCR Article 15 recognizes "the right of everyone" to "enjoy the benefits of scientific pro-
gress and its applications," and obligates states to take steps "necessary for the conservation, the develop.
ment and the diffusion of science and culture." ICESCR, supra note 250, arts. 15(0)(b), 15(2). Similarly,
the UDHR protects the right of everyone "freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to
enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits." UDHR, supra note 249, art. 27(l).
253. The above statement does not imply that the authors' rights provisions of the ICESCR and
UDHR provide a fully coherent framework for a human rights-inspired conception of intellectual prop-
erty. To the contrary, such a framework remains to be specified through, for example, additional general
comments of the ICESCR Committee, the decisions of national courts, and the writing of commentators.
254. See Dreyfuss, supra note 238, at 13-18 (critiquing human rights approaches to intellectual prop-
erty as ignoring utilitarian concerns). But see Geiger, Constitutionalising Intellectual Property Law, supra note
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adopts the balancing paradigm, the disputes it reviews will be framed not in
utilitarian terms but as clashes pitting one group of rights holders (intellec-
tual property owners) against another (such as consumers or the media). The
Court will respond to these competing claims by weighing one right against
the other. Much has been written about the problematic nature of constitu-
tional balancing methodologies.25 5 These concerns are even more compelling
when rights claims are infused with the myriad contestations of economic
and social policy that intellectual property disputes inevitably engender.
A third and final reason to eschew the intellectual property balancing
paradigm concerns the multiplier and feedback effects of ECHR rulings.
Formally, the Court's judgments are only binding as a matter of interna-
tional law and only upon the parties to each dispute. 25 6 But the influence of
European human rights jurisprudence is far more sweeping in practice. In
some countries, national courts give direct effect to ECHR judgments, a
method of compliance that leaves little room for legislative compromises
that preserve competing national values.257 In addition, legislators and
courts across Europe-including the European Court of Justice 218 --consult
ECHR case law when drafting or interpreting statutes and constitutions. 25 9
These consultations extend the Court's influence and further constrain the
discretion of domestic decisionmakers to set national intellectual property
15, at 388 (arguing that human rights "are effective tools to guarantee a balanced development and
understanding of IP rights and a remedy for the overprotective tendencies of lobby-driven legislation").
255. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
972-83 (1987) (critiquing case-by-case or ad hoc balancing standards in constitutional adjudication).
The difficulties with balancing tests include determining which factors a court should weigh against each
other and whether those factors can be measured on the same scale. More generally, balancing "expands
judicial discretion [and] frees it substantially from the need to justify and persuade .... [(it gives a view
of judicial review that is intuitional, if not incomprehensible." Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law:
Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLuM. L. REV. 1022, 1047-49 (1978).
256. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 46(1) ("The High Contracting Parties undertake to
abide by the final judgment of the Court in a case to which they are parties.").
257. See, e.g., Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Judgments by the European Court of
Human Rights, ResDH(2006)27E (June 7, 2006), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id= 1008
059&Sice = CM& BackColorlnternet = 9999CC&BackColorlntranet = FFBB55 & BackColorLogged = FF
AC75 (quoting the government of Greece's statement that "the Convention and the Court's case law
enjoy direct effect in Greek law," and citing a 2005 Court of Cassation decision that "recognised and
stressed the supra-statutory force of Article I of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention"); see also Frank
Hoffmeister, Germany: Status of European Convention on Human Rights in Domestic Law, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L.
722, 726-28 (2006) (reviewing the legal status of the Eurbpean Convention in member states).
258. See, e.g., Regione Autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v. Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e
Forestali, 2005 E.C.R. 1-3785, ¶1 125 (referencing the "case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights" as establishing the standard for assessing whether government controls on the use of property are
compatible with European Community law); Laserdisken ApS v. Kulturministeriet, 2006 E.C.R. I-
08089, ¶ 65 (stating that "intellectual property rights . . . form part of the right to property").
259. See Tom Barkuysen & Michel L. van Emmerik, A Comparative View on the Execution ofJudgments of
the European Court of Human Rights 1, 15, 19, in ECHR REMEDIES, supra note 217.
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policies.2 60 As a result, even if the ECHR intervenes in intellectual property
issues only rarely, its rulings will likely have extensive regional effects.
V. CONCLUSION
This article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the intellectual
property jurisprudence of the European Court and Commission of Human
Rights under the property rights clause of the European Convention on
Human Rights. It organizes the tribunals' decisions interpreting Article 1 of
Protocol 1 into a tripartite framework that exposes the many points of inter-
section-and of potential conflict-between human rights and intellectual
property. It also provides a vision of how the ECHR's intellectual property
jurisprudence may evolve in the future by developing three paradigms that
the Court may follow, each of which has very different consequences for
innovation and creativity policies in Europe.
The article concludes that the rule of law paradigm, which targets arbi-
trary government conduct, presents the strongest justification for the ECHR
to find in favor of intellectual property owners. Such a minimalist approach
serves the core European Convention values of promoting predictability, cer-
tainty, and adherence to the rule of law. And it does so without unduly
constraining the discretion of national legislators and judges to tailor do-
mestic intellectual property rules to local circumstances.
A more equivocal case can be made for the enforcement paradigm, which
requires national governments to provide the minimal administrative, judi-
cial, and criminal procedures necessary for intellectual property owners to
challenge infringements of their protected works. Finding Article 1 viola-
tions where a state fails to adopt such procedures provides an alternative
enforcement mechanism for rights holders to prevent widespread intellectual
property piracy. It does so, however, by circumventing the political filter
that prevents private parties from litigating intellectual property complaints
in the WTO dispute settlement system.
The intellectual property balancing paradigm presents the least persuasive
case for ECHR intervention. Under this approach, the Court determines the
legality of diminutions of intellectual property by applying Article l's fair
and proportional balance standard. It assesses the legality of expansions of
intellectual property under other European Convention provisions, such as
freedom of expression and the right of privacy. Adoption of the balancing
paradigm would create several interrelated problems, including greater com-
plexity and uncertainty and increased opportunities for forum shopping. The
paradigm would also transform the ECHR into an arbiter of intellectual
260. See id. at 12 (describing Dutch legislative proposals that were modified to comply with Article I
and stating that "in recent years the right to property, contained in Article 1 . . . seems to have been
discovered in legal practice" and "is gaining more attention in the legislative process").
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property law and policy in Europe,a role that the Court is jurisprudentially
and institutionally ill-suited to play.
Finally, this article highlights the broader theoretical and doctrinal con-
troversies over the intersection of human rights, property rights, and intel-
lectual property. The boundaries between these three areas of law are
increasingly overlapping, leading to contestations among rights holders,
governments, consumers, and nongovernmental organizations. These contes-
tations are playing out in multiple venues, including domestic courts, inter-
national tribunals, national legislatures, and intergovernmental
organizations. As these controversies become more contentious and more
pervasive, government officials, scholars, and policymakers in Europe and
elsewhere would benefit from the cautionary lessons that the ECHR's intel-
lectual property jurisprudence offers.
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